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PUBLICITY RULES FOR PUBLIC TRUSTS*
ALLISON ANNA TAIT*

Abstract
That museums arepublic trusts is a truism in academic discourse
and industry discussion. What various commentators mean when they
speak about museums as public trusts, however, is less clear. This
Article untangles and analyzes the various meanings of "'publictrust"
and how these meanings translate into regulatory systems. I propose
that two predominant meanings-the public resource and trust law
meanings-jointly constitute the definition of a public trust, and that
each meaning has a consequent regulatory framework. These
definitionaland regulatoryframeworks coexist without conflict in most
contexts. In the context of deaccessioning,however, they collide.
Deaccessioning-the practice of a museum selling art from its
collection-is highly contested because it is perceived to be a
significant violation of the public trust, in all meanings of the term.
Nonetheless, public resource and trust law rules treat deaccessioning
quite differently. Public resource rules, exemplified by industry
standards and state statutes, strictly prohibit the use of deaccessioning
funds for any purposes other than to purchase new art. Trust law rules,
on the other hand, work primarily to ensure that the terms of
organizationalcharters, trust instruments, and gift agreements are met.
One goal of this Article is to identify and describe the public resource
and trust law frameworks. A second goal is to leverage the debate
surrounding deaccessioning as a means for discussing how the two
frameworks compete and why the trust lawframework, enhanced by the
' Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in part
for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use,
subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation, and this copyright
notice and grant of permission be included in all copies.
* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. For comments and conversation,
my thanks go to Pamela Bookman, Deborah DeMott, Claudia Haupt, Jane Levine, Pippa
Loengard, Shari Motro, Luke Norris, Judith Resnik, Anne Marie Rhodes, Sarah Swan, the
members of the Associates and Fellows workshop at Columbia, and participants in the "Defining
and Delegating to the Public" panel at the 2015 annual meeting of the Association for the Study
of Culture, Law, & the Humanities. My thanks go as well to Erin Whelan for her excellent
assistance and the Journal editors for their much appreciated contributions.
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addition of corporate governance principles and grounded in
"publicity" values, is preferable.
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Suspicion always attaches to mystery. It thinks it sees a crime
where it beholds an affectation of secresy; and it is rarely deceived ...
The best project prepared in darkness, would excite more alarm than the
worst, undertaken under the auspices of publicity.
- Jeremy Bentham, Of Publicity'

Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman.

- Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do2

INTRODUCTION

When the City of Detroit declared bankruptcy on July 18, 2013,
creditors immediately targeted the Detroit Institute of Arts-and its
outstanding art collection, which was subsequently valued at anywhere
between $870 million and $4.6 billion-as a potential source of revenue
I Jeremy Bentham, Chapter 1: Of Publicity, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (1843),

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bentham-the-works-of-jeremy-bentham-vol-2/simple#lfO87202 label_002 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
2 Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
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to pay city debts, including municipal workers' pensions. Warning of
harm from liquidating the artwork to pay creditors, museum officials
argued that the museum was a source of "civic pride and an
irreplaceable Public institution. '' 3 Museum officials stated that,
"consistent with the public-trust doctrine, the Museum Art Collection is
subject 'to the paramount right of the public to enjoy the benefit of the
trust.' 4 Creditors could not treat the art collection like an ordinary
asset, so the argument went, because the museum was a public trust.
That museums are public trusts is a truism in academic discourse
and industry discussion. 5 What is meant when various commentators
speak about museums as public trusts, however, is less clear. 6 This
Article untangles the diverse meanings that constitute the notion of a
public trust and analyzes when and how various meanings diverge. I
suggest in this Article that there are two predominant meanings that
jointly constitute the definition of a public trust: the public resource and
trust law meanings, each possessing a related regulatory framework.
The public resource notion is exemplified in industry rules and state
statutes; predictably, trust law and principles give legal form to the trust
law understanding. These regulatory frameworks coexist peaceably in
most contexts. That there is slippage and overlap between the two sets
of meaning is unproblematic-the indeterminacy of meaning may
produce a more resonant understanding of the institution, one rich in
layers and complex in definition. In the context of deaccessioning,
however, the frameworks collide.
Deaccessioning-the practice of a museum selling art from its
collection-is a highly contested practice because it is perceived to be a
violation of the public trust, according to both public resource and trust
law frameworks. 7 Nonetheless, public resource and trust law rules treat
3 Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City's Amended Plan of
Confirmation at 10, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May, 27, 2014),
http://www.artlawreport.com/files/2014/05/DIA-Response-to-Motion-re-collection.pdf.
4 Id. at 19 (citing Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (2005)).
5 See, e.g., Code of Ethicsfor Museums, AMERICAN ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS (2000), http://aamus.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-of-ethics ("Museum governance in its
various forms is a public trust responsible for the institution's service to society."). See also
Andrew W. Eklund, Every Rose Has Its Thorn: a New Approach to Deaccession, 6 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 467, 471 (2010) ("Museums are typically considered public trusts.").
6 In sum, a museum's "public trust" is indeed "nebulous." It appears to be a theoretical mix
of the undefined understanding that museums ought to use museum resources for
public benefit; the duties placed upon museum directors by their non-profit status,
corporate charter, or charitable trust document; fiduciary duties and donor
expectations.
See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The "Public Trust", U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2015)
(providing an in-depth overview and history of the meaning of "public trust").
7 The Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) defines deaccessioning as "the process by
which a work of art or other object (collectively, a "work"), wholly or in part, is permanently
removed from a museum's collection." AAMD TASK FORCE ON DEACCESSION1NG, AAMD
POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING 2 (June 9, 2010), http://0338c93.netsolhost.com/cms/wp-
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deaccessioning quite differently. Public resource rules strictly prohibit
the use of deaccessioning funds for any purposes other than the
purchase of new art. 8 Trust law rules, on the other hand, work primarily
to ensure that trust terms and gift conditions are met. 9 One goal of this
Article is to identify and describe the public resource and trust law
frameworks. A second goal is to use the debate surrounding
deaccessioning as a means for discussing how the two frameworks
compete and why the trust law framework-enhanced by the addition of
corporate governance principles-is preferable.
The public resource understanding of the museum has its roots in
the long history of museums as public and educational institutions,
charged with the mission to steward both works of art and the public's
trust. This theory derives support from tax and resource law. Museums
are obligated to confer "public benefit" because they receive the
preferential tax treatment accorded to all charitable organizations.' 0 In
addition, the legal concept of art as a public resource-akin to a natural
resource-carries with it similar concepts of stewardship and public
access. This understanding is embedded in museum mission statements,
industry rules, and certain state statutes that regulate museums as state
cultural institutions. For example, New York Rules and Regulations
state, "Public trust means the responsibility of institutions to carry out
activities and hold their assets in trust for the public benefit.""II
The trust law understanding, while related, is slightly different. In
the trust context, some museums are considered public trusts because
their organizational form is that of a charitable trust. More broadly,
nonprofit institutions, regardless of organizational form, are governed
by trust principles in the management of institutional funds. In addition,

content/uploads/2011/05/Deaccessioning-Policy-AAMD.pdf.
8 The AAMD states: "Proceeds from a deaccessioned work are used only to acquire other works
of art-the proceeds are never used as operating funds, to build a general endowment, or for any
other expenses." AAMD, ART MUSEUMS AND THE PRACTICE OF DEACCESSIONING 1 (2011),
https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/PositionPaper
Deaccessioning%2011.07.pdf.
9 Deaccessioning cases can make it into a courtroom in the absence of gift restrictions. See
Jennifer L. White, When It's OK To Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-DutyFrameworkfor
Analyzing the Deaccessioningof Art to Meet Museum OperatingExpenses, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1041, 1044 (1996) ("Deaccessioning controversies generally come to the attention of courts in
one of two ways: through directors seeking court approval prior to deaccessioning or through the
state attorney general seeking to prevent such a transaction."). Museum board members or
trustees can be charged with breach of fiduciary duty by the state attorney general or uniquely
interested beneficiaries. Furthermore, the state attorney general can choose to challenge a
particular sale, deploying the power allocated to her on behalf of the people. See Derek Fincham,
Deaccession of Art from the Public Trust, 16 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 1, 16 (2011). Claims of this
type are rarely pursued, however, given sparse staffing in any given attorney general's office and
the potential bad politics of bringing such suits.
10 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) ("Charitable exemptions are
justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit... .
I1 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 3.27(a)(18) (2011).
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the vast majority of museums acquire a significant number of artworks
in the form of charitable donations whose disposition, particularly when
the gift is restricted, is governed by trust principles. Accordingly, trust
law concerning charitable gifts and fiduciary duty bind the range of
permissible actions for museum trustees. Legal obligations to the public
exist as well, since the public is the intended beneficiary of the
charitable gifts and trusts, but legal duty flows most specifically
between the trustee and the institution as well as its assets.
On the subject of deaccessioning, these two legal frameworks
present a study in contrast. The public resource rules privilege the
principle of art as a unique, public resource and consequently enforce a
strict prohibition on certain forms of deaccessioning. From this
perspective, there is a sense that "once an object ha[s] entered a
museum collection, it should be considered a permanent part of the
public patrimony[.]"' 12 Deaccessioning is seen as a betrayal of the social
meaning of art and museums, of institutional mission and cultural
values: "Deaccessions are unromantic (how could a thing of
inexplicable value be sold for cash?) and undemocratic (the sale of art
out of the public sphere represents a lost opportunity for the greater
populace to profit from viewing artwork)."' 13 For all these reasons,

"[d]eaccession has become something of a dirty word in museum
circles."' 14 Trust law rules, on the other hand, demand compliance with
applicable trust terms and gift restrictions. Trust law rules privilege the
concept of the trustee's responsibility and fiduciary duty. Trust law
rules, therefore, focus less on the unique nature of art as an asset and
more on gift compliance as well as asset management.
In this Article, I argue that trust law rules-enhanced with
disclosure principles derived from corporate governance in order to
provide additional constraints on trustees-are ultimately preferable.
Public resource rules are problematic because they both rely on an
undifferentiated notion of the public and hamper the ability of trustees
and directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties. Trust law rules ensure gift
compliance, which is the foremost obligation. These rules also allow
trustees and directors more managerial discretion in institutional
governance, a grant that is especially important in times of financial
difficulty, and privilege process over principle. Furthermore, corporate
law principles of disclosure and publicity can be used to modify and
enhance trust rules in order to ensure that mechanisms exist for taking
into account the public as an important stakeholder and holding trustees
and directors of museums accountable for their decision-making.
12 STEPHEN E. WEIL,RETHINKING THE MUSEUM AND OTHER MEDITATIONS 105

(1990).

13Jason R. Goldstein, Deaccession:Not Such a Dirty Word, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213,
246 (1997)
14 Id. at 216.
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Properly regulating museums is an important undertaking because

museums are a crucial part of the social fabric. In the United States
alone there are approximately 850 million visits each year to American
museums. 15 "Every major city either wants an art museum or wants a
bigger or better one. Supported by a booming economy, intense civic
pride, and local and state governments' growing awareness of the
economic benefits of cultural tourism, museums across America have
become the defining public institutions of the communities."' 16 As the
Detroit example underscores, however, numerous factors have led

museums into financial distress in the past decades, thereby forcing
them to consider deaccessioning artworks from their collection in an
attempt

to

generate

revenue.

The

strict

public-resource

based

prohibition against using funds for operational deficits deprives
museums of an increasingly important option when confronted with
critical budget shortfalls. Moreover, while museums-as quintessential

public trust institutions-are the focus of this Article, an inquiry into
what the most appropriate governance rules are for public trusts is also
relevant in the context of libraries, public universities, and other
historically public institutions. As a former director of the Detroit
Institute of Arts remarked, "If you could sell off Detroit's hospitals and

its universities, would you do that, too? If you do things like this, you're
basically spelling the end of the city as an ongoing entity."' 17
Legal scholars who address deaccessioning generally argue that
industry rules concerning deaccessioning should be relaxed in order to
allow museums to spend funds raised though deaccessioning on
operational needs, especially in times of financial distress. 18 Among
museum administrators and industry leaders, however, there is great
15Museum Facts, AMERICAN ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-us.org/aboutmuseums/museum-facts (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
16 Glenn D. Lowry, A DeontologicalApproach to Art Museums and the Public Trust, in WHOSE
MUSE? ART MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 131 (James B. Cuno & Neil MacGregor eds.,
2004).
17 Randy Kennedy & Monica Davies, Detroit's Creditors Eye Its Art Collection, N.Y. TIMES,
July 19, 2013, at CI.
18See, e.g., Sara Tam, In Museums We Trust: Analyzing the Mission of Museums,
DeaccessioningPolicies, and the Public Trust, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 900 (2012) ("While a
strict rule on the use of deaccessioning proceeds, currently endorsed by professional
organizations, places a well-founded emphasis on protecting the public trust's holding in art, the
survival of a museum as a cultural forum for its community warrants equal attention."). See also
Jorja A. Cirigliana, Let Them Sell Art: Why a Broader Deaccession Policy Today Could Save
Museums Tomorrow, 20 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 365, 368 (2011) ("[D]eaccession policies
should be broadened to (1) allow museums to deaccession objects based on financial necessity
and (2) allow museums to apply deaccession proceeds to operating costs."); Jennifer L. White,
When It's OK To Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Framework for Analyzing the
Deaccessioning of Art to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1041, 1048
(1996) ("[C]ourts should approve a museum director's use of proceeds from the sale of
deaccessioned art to meet operating expenses if the director's conduct comports with the duties of
trustees under the law of trusts.").
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debate about whether the deaccessioning rules are in need of
modification. The deaccessioning debate in this realm is highly
contentious and the industry rules have strong supporters. 19 Missing in
all the conversations is a robust understanding of the multiple and
sometimes conflicting legal frameworks that construct and support the
notion of a public trust. Also missing is substantive discussion about
what theoretical principles should guide public trust regulation. This
Article fills those lacunae.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. In the first Part, I identify and
describe the differences between the public resource and trust law
frameworks. I analyze what values compose each framework and the
regulatory system attached to each framework. In the second Part, I
evaluate current cases in which museums have considered or put into
effect deaccessioning plans. I describe the circumstances surrounding
these attempts as well as the resulting public debate, industry sanctions,
and legal proceedings. I demonstrate, through these case studies, the
limits and shortcomings of the public resource framework. In particular,
I analyze how the public resource framework can be counterproductive
in serving the public by forcing financially strapped institutions to close
or cut public programs rather than use deaccessioning funds for
operations. Moreover, I explain how the public resource framework
relies on a flawed and incomplete understanding of the public. Finally, I
evaluate how the public resource framework may prevent trustees and
directors from fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the institution.
In the third Part, I explain how the trust law framework provides
the more suitable regulatory apparatus and suggest ways in which that
framework can be enhanced in order to focus on the public nature of the
charitable institution. More specifically, I propose the expansion of cy
pres, a trust doctrine used to modify restricted gift terms, to enable
increased procedural transparency through judicial intervention.
Likewise, I suggest corporate law models for new rules concerning
information disclosure, public auction, and special duties in the context
of financial insolvency. These solutions to the deaccessioning problem,
I argue, help embed publicity values in rules appropriate to a public
trust.
I. PUBLIC TRUST RULES
In order to approach the joint question of deaccessioning and
19See, e.g., Lee Rosenbaum, From Detroit to Delaware: Why We Need Government Deaccession
Regulations, CULTUREGRRL (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:38 PM), http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/.
On the other side of the debate, a strong critic of the deaccessioning rules is Donn Zaretsky. See
Donn Zaretsky, AAMD Rules Need to be Deaccessioned, ART IN AMERICA (Mar. 31, 2009),
http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/aamd-rules-need-to-be-

deaccessioned.
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optimal public trust regulation, it is important to understand what is
meant by a public trust and what rules currently apply. Public trust is
"[a] multivalent term that implies both a set of responsibilities-to
preserve, protect, and enhance property held on behalf of the publicand a code of conduct to ensure that this responsibility is discharged
with the highest degree of skill and diligence. '20 I suggest that two
primary frameworks exist. Both conceive of the museum as owing a
duty to the public while also being stewards of the artwork.
Nonetheless, the frameworks are undergirded by different social and
legal values.
A. The Public Resource Framework
This Part provides a brief overview of how museums came to be
widely considered as exemplary public institutions and explains how the
conception of the museum as a public institution has informed
institutional mission statements, industry rules, and state statutes. I also
describe the legal doctrines, drawn from both tax and public resource
law, which support this public resource framework.
1. Mission Statements and Industry Rules
Historically speaking, the museum is "primarily a creation of the
Enlightenment." 2' Born of the era that gave rise to modem notions of
the public sphere, "the museum was construed to be fundamentally
educational, a venue for the systematic organization and presentation of
artistic, natural, and scientific phenomena. Inherent in this is the idea of
the museum as a public space. '22 The first large American museumssuch as the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Boston Museum of
Fine Arts-were built according to this Enlightenment model. 23 These
large-scale museums were thought to possess "the capacity to elevate
the taste and purify the morals of its visitors" 24 and to "cultivate[] good
citizens who would then share in the general prosperity of a properly

20 Lowry, supra note 16, at 134.

21Id.at 139-40. Lowry adds that "the idea of the museum derives from Plato's academy and the
Alexandria of the Ptolemies in particular." Id.
22 Id.
[T]he museum ought to emphasize the fact that it has traditionally been and still
remains one of the few public spaces in which people of every background can gather
together for peaceful exchange in a secure surrounding. In that mode, the museum
might be understood as a contemporary descendent of such earlier public gathering

places as the Roman bath, the medieval cathedral and the New England village green.
Stephen Weil, The Museum and the Public, 16 MUSEUM MGMT. & CURATORSHIP 257, 266

(1997).
23Id. at 140 ("The great museums of the United States founded in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries ... were founded on the enlightenment model.").
24 Weil, supra note 22, at 267.
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functioning democracy. ' 25 While museums were conceived as part of a
democratic sphere, and seen as emblematic public institutions, in
practice they were strongly associated with elite culture. Neil Harris has
remarked that American museums "up through the early 1960s might be
said to have constituted a self-enclosed world, clearly defined by
hierarchies of prestige and privilege, visited by largely traditional
audiences, and promulgating an ideal of self-restraint in their display of
' 26
art, history, science, and culture."

By the 1960s and 1970s, however, cultural shifts and political
upheaval shook museums loose from their position as staid institutions
of cultural authority. In an era of war, political turbulence, and a
blossoming counter-culture, "[a] pervasive sense existed that museum
governance, attendance, collecting and exhibition policies reflected
racial, gender, religious, and class dominance. '27 The museum ceased to
occupy a wholly "transcendent" role and became instead "implicated in
the distribution of wealth, power, knowledge and taste shaped by the
larger social order."'28 Taking seriously the critique of elitism, museums
endeavored to transform from "temple to forum," in the words' 29of
Stephen Weil, in order to "create an equality of cultural opportunity."
Consequently, museums engaged in an increasing amount of
public outreach and education-including to new demographics and
populations. The result has been that museums are now "active suitors
of new audiences, they partner with a variety of civic and cultural
organizations ... they tackle themes that are socially relevant and court

controversy.

'30

This renewed focus on the public has also confirmed the

importance of the public trust idea. Glenn Lowry, director of the

Museum of Modem Art, describing the duty of museums to the public,
has remarked that museums must "act in a way that ensures the public
25Michael Kimmelman, Museums in a Quandary: Where Are the Ideals?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2001, § 2, at 26.
26 Neil Harris, The Divided House of the American Art Museum, 128 DAEDALUS AM. MUSEUMS
33,38(1999).
27 Id. at 43.
28 Weil, supra note 22, at 262 (citing a Neal Harris 1986 address). These accusations leveled
against museums by a new generation of art activists were bolstered, as time passed, by the
theoretical interventions of cultural critics who "unmask[ed] the structures, rituals, and
procedures by which the relations between objects, bodies of knowledge, and processes of
ideological persuasion are enacted." Daniel Sherman & hit Rogoff, Introduction, in MUSEUM
CULTURE: HISTORIES, DISCOURSES, SPECTACLES x (Daniel Sherman & Irit Rogoff, eds. 1994).
See also Harris, supra note 26, at 48-51; Kimmelman, supra note 25 ("Cultural theorists like
Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault ... cast[] doubts on the benevolence of a range of
institutions previously viewed as benign and progressive: hospitals, universities and libraries as
well as museums. These institutions came to be viewed as disciplinary enforcers in class and race
wars.").
29 Duncan F. Cameron, The Museum, A Temple or the Forum, in REINVENTING THE MUSEUM:
THE EVOLVING CONVERSATION ON THE PARADIGM SHIFT 59 (Gail Anderson ed., 2012) (citing
Stephen Weil).
30 Harris, supra note 26, at 38.
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retains faith or confidence-that is, trust-in their activities. To do so,
'31
they must act with integrity and justice."
This new-or revived-sense of public orientation and
accountability is reflected in updated institutional mission statements.
For example, the Glenbow Museum's mission is the following: "To be a
place where people find meaning and value, and delight in exploring the
diversity of the human experience. '32 Industry standards demonstrate
the same public focus. In its Code of Ethics, the American Alliance of
Museums (AAM) states: "Museums in the United States are grounded
in the tradition of public service. They are organized as public trusts,
holding their collections and information as a benefit for those they
were established to serve.... Loyalty to the mission of the museum and
to the public it serves is the essence of museum work."' 33 The AAM
further states, in its Standards Regarding Public Trust and
Accountability, that:
* The museum is a good steward of its resources held in the
public trust.
* The museum identifies the communities it serves and
makes appropriate decisions in how it serves them.
" The museum asserts its public service role and places
34
education at the center of that role.
Museums are stewards not just of works of art, but also of public
mission and interest.
Because of this understanding that the public is the paramount
constituent of the museum, institutional action that is perceived to be
contrary to the public interest-like deaccessioning-is penalized.
Subject to limitation, deaccessioning is-in theory-an accepted part of
collection management. The AAMD states in its report on the AAMD
Policy of Deaccessioning (the "Report"): "Deaccessioning is a
legitimate part of the formation and care of collections, and, if practiced,
Lowry, supra note 16, at 134. Lowry has stated: "For insofar as public trust means retaining
the confidence of the public, museums must be perceived to be acting both responsibly and for
the coming good. This requires that art museums-at a minimum-inspire confidence in the
public that they have made considered judgments about what works of art to collect or to borrow,
about how those objects should be displayed and for what purpose, and about what exhibitions
and programs to present." Id.
32Weil, supra note 22, at 269. The Glenbow is in Calgary, Canada.
33 Code of Ethics for Museums, AMERICAN ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS (2000), http://aamus.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-of-ethics. The non-profit International
Council of Museums states, "[a] museum is a non-profit, permanent institution in the service of
society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches,
communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment
for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment." 3 INT'L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS STATUTES
§ 1 (2007), http://archives.icom.museum/hist def eng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
31

34 Standards Regarding Public Trust and Accountability, AMERICAN ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS,

http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/public-trust
July 22, 2015).
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should be done in order to refine and improve the quality and
appropriateness of the collections, the better to serve the museum's
mission. '35 There is, however, an important caveat. The most debated
provision in the Report states: "Funds received from the disposal of a
deaccessioned work shall not be used for operations or capital expenses.
Such funds, including any earnings and appreciation thereon, may be
used only for the acquisition of works. '36 Furthermore, the Report
warns that, in the case of a violation, an institution could face sanctions
including de-accreditation. This deaccessioning prohibition stems from
the notion that art is a unique public resource and that subsequently any
action that commodifies art-and potentially takes it out of the public
realm-without public consent is illegitimate.
2. State Rules and the Codification of Mission
Like most mission statements and the rules set by industry leaders,
state rules and regulations governing museums also deploy the term
public trust in a very broad and encompassing sense. In New Yorkhome to both a wealth of museums and of controversy-the Board of
Regents oversees the majority of museums. 37 Regent rules govern
deaccessioning and are set forth in the local rules section entitled
Charteringand registration of museums and historical societies with
collections.38 The Regent rules present an almost mirror image of The
35AAMD TASK FORCE ON DEACCESSIONING, AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING 4 (June 9,
2010), http://0338c93.netsolhost.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Deaccessioning-PolicyAAMD.pdf. The Report, accordingly, lists eight primary reasons for which an institution might
choose to deaccession a piece, also including restitution obligations, the disposal of fraudulent art,
and the physical condition of a work. The Report also clarifies the procedures to be followed,
such as the notification of any living artist or donor, and preferred methods of disposal. Id. at 5-6.
36 Id.at 4.
37 The Board of Regents oversees museums that are chartered with the state:
In New York State, education corporations are created by the Board of Regents of The
University of the State of New York ...Nonprofit organizations and institutions with
educational purposes, such as schools and cultural agencies, seeking to incorporate,
must do so under Education Law § 216, subject to the authority of the Regents ...A
museum or historical society that wishes to organize as a nonprofit education
corporation must do so by petitioning the Board of Regents for the issuance of a
charter. A charter is granted by the Board of Regents as an instrument of incorporation
to museums and historical societies that satisfy Regents standards of organizational and
educational quality. These standards are consistent with professionally accepted
principles and practices as adopted by the American Association of Museums and the
American Association for State and Local History.
Chartering,NEW YORK STATE MUSEUM, http://www.nysm.nysed.gov/charter/ (last visited Sept.
27, 2015).
38N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 3.27. The section defines a museum as
an organized not-for-profit institution, including but not limited to halls of fame, zoos,
aquariums, botanical gardens and arboretums, that is essentially educational or
aesthetic in purpose, with professional staff, which ordinarily owns, exhibits,
maintains, and/or utilizes artifacts, art, and/or specimens, including non-tangible
electronic, video, digital and similar art, cares for them, and exhibits them to the public
on some regular schedule.
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Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) rules. The Regent rules
present a museum's legal obligations as flowing from its status as a
public trust institution, and define public trust accordingly: "Public trust
means the responsibility of institutions to carry out activities and hold
their assets in trust for the public benefit. ' 39 Based on this
understanding, the rules allow museums to deaccession works in a
limited set of circumstances, including when the item is redundant,
inauthentic, or being repatriated. 40 The regulations also place a strict
prohibition on the use of deaccessioning funds for certain purposes,
including general operations. The regulations state:
[P]roceeds derived from the deaccessioning of any property from the
institution's collection be restricted in a separate fund to be used only
for the acquisition of collections, or the preservation, conservation or
direct care of collections. In no event shall proceeds derived from the
property from the collection be used for
deaccessioning of 4any
1
operating expenses.

Other states have similar deaccessioning laws on the books. 42 An
Indiana statute sets forth a set of nine criteria that render deaccessioning
acceptable. 4 3 A New Mexico statute requires that funds generated from

deaccessioning be placed in a separate account within the state treasury
and that the funds be expended "for the sole purpose of acquiring
objects for that museum's collection. '44 Louisiana has a statute
regulating the "Sale and deaccession of university museum collection
Id.
39 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 3.27(a)(18).
40 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 3.27. Appropriate reasons for deaccessioning are
(i) the item is inconsistent with the mission of the institution as set forth in its mission
statement; (ii) the item has failed to retain its identity; (iii) the item is redundant; (iv)
the item's preservation and conservation needs are beyond the capacity of the
institution to provide; (v) the item is deaccessioned to accomplish refinement of
collections; (vi) it has been established that the item is inauthentic; (vii) the institution
is repatriating the item or returning the item to its rightful owner; (viii) the institution is
returning the item to the donor, or the donor's heirs or assigns, to fulfill donor
restrictions relating to the item which the institution is no longer able to meet; (ix) the
item presents a hazard to people or other collection items; and/or (x) the item has been
lost or stolen and has not been recovered.
Id.
41N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 3.27
42 Nine states have some form of regulation concerning deaccessioning. Those states, in addition
to New York and New Mexico, are Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Pennsylvania,
and Vermont. The Tribal Little River Band of Ottawa also addresses deaccessioning in its
Collection Policy Ordinance.
43See 313 IND. ADMIN. CODE 3-1-6.
44 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 9-4A-20 (West) ("To comply with national museum ethical guidelines,
each museum may have a subaccount in the museum collections fund into which the proceeds of
the deaccessioning of its collection items and income from investment of the proceeds are
credited.").
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items," 45 which provides that "[n]o object may be sold or deaccessioned
less than two years after its acquisition by the museum" and lists five
acceptable modes of disposal. 46 Some states, in addition to New York,
also require that all donors be provided with notice of a museum's
deaccessioning policy. 47 For example, Vermont requires that museums
provide "a donor or prospective donor with a written copy of its mission
statement and collections policy, which shall include policies and
procedures of the museum related to deaccessioning. ' '48 Other local laws
may apply as well. For example, the Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians has a Collection Policy Ordinance, ensuring that "deaccession
does not conflict with the established tribal collection goals[.]" 49 In all
these cases, state statutes, generally found in titles governing cultural
facilities or historic preservation, focus on both restricting the use of
deaccessioning funds and aligning state rules with industry standards.
3. Artwork as a Public Resource
Supporting local and industry rules that govern museums are two
legal doctrines-one from public resource law and the other from tax
law. Public resource doctrine "originated in the Roman concept of
public property, which stipulated that certain parts of the environmentthe air, rivers and the sea, for example, were not subject to private
ownership. Rather, they were dedicated for public use." 50 This notion
subsequently appeared in European civil law and English common law
in similar contexts, and the idea was extended to artworks (although less
frequently). Accordingly, "once a work of art enters a museum
collection, that museum holds those works in the public trust for future
generations in much the same way that the public may enjoy navigation
on public waterways."'5' Art also occupies a unique position as a public
resource because it is often thought to be reflective of national and local
cultures and therefore perceived to constitute part of a nation's cultural
heritage.
Because "the public trust doctrine would treat art as an abstract
45 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25:1101.
46 Id.

47N.Y. PARKS REC. & HIST. PRESERV. LAW § 19.28 (McKinney) ("Prior to the acquisition of
property by gift, the office shall provide the donor with a written copy of the appropriate facility

collections policy, which shall include policies and procedures of the office relating to
deaccessioning.").
48 27 VT.STAT. ANN. § 1155 (West).
49 Native American Rights Fund, Collection Policy (Aug. 30, 2006), http://www.narf.org/
nill/codes/littleriver band/code040712/500/500_06.pdf.
50 Fincham, supra note 9, at 24. For an examination of the historical origins of the environmental
public trust doctrine, see Kreder, supra note 6 (manuscript at 19) ("certain environmental
resources are held in a modem day 'public trust,' but the doctrine concerning natural resources
has ancient roots").
51 Fincham, supra note 9, at 27.
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trust held by public institutions as a public resource,"5 2 museums hold
the twin duties of stewarding the art and providing public access. The
idea of an "abstract trust" gives rise to notions of legal responsibility, in
particular duties of trusteeship for museum leaders. Museum leaders
therefore routinely define themselves as caretakers of public resources
and "good steward[s] of [the] resources held in the public trust. '53 This
idea of an "abstract trust" also emphasizes the public's role as
beneficiary. Unlike with a private trust, "[t]he trustees of an art
museum, those entrusted to care for and maintain a particular
community's patrimony, do not owe a fiduciary duty to a particular
person but to the public as a whole."' 54 This duty entails ensuring public
access to the art, 55 which has implications for deaccessioning because
"once an object is put into the public domain in the form of a charitable
'56
gift or trust, the object cannot later be returned to private hands.
Elaborating on both public access and the sale of art, one scholar states:
"There are three general restrictions on governmental authority which
are imposed by the public trust: the property must be available for the
general public; the property may not be sold; and the property must be
'57
maintained for traditional uses."
Consequently, the Detroit Institute of Arts, objecting to the plan
for generating revenue by selling art, invoked the public resource
doctrine: "Under the public-trust doctrine, governmental entities have a
duty to preserve and protect resources held in trust for the public. 58 The
Institute observed that, "[although] no Michigan court has addressed
whether the public-trust doctrine applies to cultural property such as art
held for public exhibition, strong consideration should be given to
expanding the scope of the doctrine to other public resources." 59
Moreover, the Institute argued that, in conjunction with the public-trust
doctrine, the collection was protected by an implied trust:
More compelling than any formal trust agreement, the Museum itself
is the evidence of the DIA Charitable Trust. It has served for more
52 Tam, supranote 18, at 861.
53 American Alliance of Museums, supra note 34.
54 Goldstein, supra note 13, at 214.
55 Heather Hope Stephens, All in a Day's Work: How Museums May Approach Deaccessioning
as a Necessary Collections Management Tool, 22 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 119,
122 (2012) (because "[a] museum's collection can be viewed as a cultural property belonging to
the public .. . it is important to keep the works of art available to that public.").
56 Patty Gerstenblith, The FiduciaryDuties of Museum Trustees, 8 COLUM. J. ART & L. 175, 192
(1983-1984).
57 Fincham, supra note 9, at 27. See also JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 31 (1999).
58 Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City's Amended Plan of
Confirmation at 19, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May, 27, 2014),
http://www.artlawreport.com/files/2014/05/DIA-Response-to-Motion-re-collection.pdf.
59 Id.
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than a century as a vessel into which thousands of donors, both
and goodwill to advance
public and private, have poured their goods
60
the "knowledge and enjoyment of art."

4. Tax Exemption and the Public as "Vicarious Donors"
Tax law concepts, in particular the concept of the public as a
vicarious donor, help give legal substance to the public resource
framework. This idea of the public as a collective donor stems from the
preferential tax treatment that charitable organizations receive.
61
Charitable organizations are exempt from paying federal income tax;
they are likewise often exempt from paying most state taxes, including
income tax, sales tax, and property tax. 62 In addition, gifts made to
museums are tax-deductible, subject to certain limitations. 63 Because of
these tax exemptions, characterized by some as subsidies, 64 courts have
conceptualized the public as having a kind of proprietary interest in
charitable organizations.
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Court reinforced this
idea after analyzing the legislative history of the tax exemption for
charitable organizations:
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all
taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for
the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and
vicarious "donors." Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that
65
the exempt entity confers a public benefit.
The public is key because its members are indirect donors to the
institution through their tax dollars. Because of this indirect subvention,
"the trustees of a charitable or nonprofit institution have a duty of
loyalty to the public, based upon the concepts of ... the public as
'66
supporter of the institution through the grant of special tax treatment.
This concept dovetails in many ways with the trust law framework,
because it focuses on charitable gifts and their treatment. The idea of the

60 The Museum labeled itself as the "DIA Charitable Trust" not on the basis of an explicit trust
having been created but rather on the basis of its activity. The Museum argued that the
institution's articles of incorporation and subsequent operating agreement indicated an intention
for the museum to operate as a charitable organization and trust repository for gifts of artwork.
See id. at 18.
61Federal tax-exempt status for organizations is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c).
62 State exemptions from tax payments vary according to state. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF
TAXATION AND FIN., A GUIDE TO SALES TAX IN NEW YORK STATE FOR EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, PUBLICATION 843 (2009).
63The deduction is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 170. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2) defines entities to which
deductible contributions may be made. Congress first adopted this deduction in 1917.
64 For a discussion of the deductions as subsidies, see Daniel I. Halperin, Is Income Tax
Exemptionfor Charitiesa Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REv. 283 (2011).
65Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
66 Gerstenblith, supra note 56, at 182.
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public as a set of vicarious donors lacks, however, the specificity
needed for trust rules to govern. That is to say, no direct gift is made nor
are any concrete restrictions placed on the "gift." There is no trust
instrument or gift agreement for trust law to enforce. Like the public
resource doctrine, this tax concept focuses on an abstract notion of the
public, and creates indeterminate duties based upon a triangulated
relationship between the government, the institution, and the public.
B. The Trust Law Framework
Where the public resource framework places primary focus on the
role and rights of the public as well the public nature of the artwork, the
trust law framework places focus on institutional governance, the use
and disposition of charitable gifts, and the trustee's fiduciary duties.
Trust law regulation of deaccessioning is more concerned with the
concrete terms of trust instruments and gift agreements, and turns on
questions of legal compliance rather than public access.
1. Trust as Organizational Form
From inception, some museums have trust obligations that derive
from their organizational form. As charitable organizations, museums
must be constituted as either corporations or trusts before applying for
tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service. A number of
major museums, including the Getty Museum in Los Angeles, are
constituted therefore as charitable trusts. One of the defining
characteristics of charitable trusts-in contrast to private trusts-is that
they have no ascertainable beneficiaries. Rather, the trust must possess a
charitable purpose: "A charitable trust may be created for the relief of
poverty, the advancement of education or religion, the promotion of
health, governmental or municipal purposes, or other purposes the
achievement of which is beneficial to the community. '' 67 The charitable
purpose is set forth in the trust agreement, or instrument. In the case of
most charitable trusts, the public at large is the beneficiary; in other
words, the "trustee has only the legal ownership of the trust assets,
while, in the case of a museum, the beneficial ownership of the museum
'68
collection and other assets belongs to the public."
The charitable trust form grants limited rights to the public as
beneficiary. The majority of trust rules, however, center on the trustee.
Generally, the duties of a trustee are set forth in Article 8 of the
Uniform Trust Code, although the rules may vary by state. Trustees are
primarily bound by fiduciary duties that include the duties of care and

67
68

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(a) (2005).
Gerstenblith, supra note 56, at 181.
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loyalty; some commentators also identify a duty of obedience. 69 These
duties are owed to the trust assets as well as the beneficiary. 70 The duty
of care requires trustees to "exercise reasonable care and diligence in
the management of the museum's assets .... The duty of care includes

the duty to take possession of and to protect investment, and, in some
circumstances, to sell trust assets to render the trust more profitable."' 71
The duty of care also helps to define asset management and investment
strategies, requiring a portfolio theory of investment, and setting forth
the prudent investor standard. 72 The Uniform Prudent Management of
Institutional Funds Act addresses questions concerning the proper
investment of institutional funds and accounting procedures. 73
The duty of loyalty requires that the trustee remain loyal to the
purposes for which the trust was created in executing the trust terms. As
stated in the Uniform Trust Code: "The duty of loyalty [is], perhaps the
most fundamental duty of the trustee.... A trustee owes a duty of
loyalty to the beneficiaries, a principle which is sometimes expressed as
the obligation of the trustee not to place the trustee's own interests over
those of the beneficiaries. ' 74 In the case of a charitable trust, the duty of
loyalty applies "even though the beneficiaries of charitable trusts are
indefinite. In the case of a charitable trust, the trustee must administer
the trust solely in the interests of effectuating the trust's charitable
purposes."75
The vast majority of charitable organizations are not, however,
charitable trusts. Rather, the lion's share of the over 600,000 public
charities in the United States are formed as non-profit corporations.
Non-profit corporations are nonetheless subject to many of the same
trust principles and rules that charitable trusts are, particularly with
respect to gift administration. Furthermore, directors of non-profit
corporations are similarly bound by the same fiduciary duties. 76 One
69 PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 253 (3d ed. 2012). For a

discussion of the nature and complexities of fiduciary duty, see Deborah DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis ofFiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879.
70 See White, supra note 9, at 1051 ("Furthermore, both trustees and directors fulfill these duties
in light of a fiduciary relationship with the public... .
71 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 69, at 287.
72 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804. Prudent Administration. A trustee shall administer the trust as a
prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other
circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care,
skill, and caution.
73 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, THE UNIFORM
PRUDENT
MANAGEMENT
OF
INSTITUTIONAL
FUNDS
ACT
(UPMIFA)
(2006),
http://www.uniformaws.org/shared/docs/prudent/20mgt%2
/of/20institutional %2funds/upmif
a_final 06.pdf. For more on UPMIFA, see Susan Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor
Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REv. 1277
(2006-2007).
74 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802. Duty of Loyalty.
75Id.
76 See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 56, at 177; White, supra note 9, at 1041.
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major difference is that directors, unlike trustees, are protected by the
business judgment rule, which requires that corporate directors act in
good faith. Directors therefore may have more discretion than trustees
to manage the internal operations of the institution and may be more
immune to claims of breach of fiduciary duty. Also, unlike trustees,
directors are not subject to a complete prohibition on self-dealing. 77
Directors can engage in interested transactions with prior board
approval, as long as they can demonstrate that the transaction was fair to
all parties and executed in good faith.
A small number of differences exist between the fiduciary
standards for trustees and directors, but what gap there is between the
two is increasingly small. The initial reason for the difference in
standards turned on "a recognition of the fact that corporate directors
have many areas of responsibility, while the traditional trustee is often
charged only with the management of the trust funds and can therefore
be expected to devote more time and expertise to that task. ' 78
Subsequently, however, scholars have observed that "the distinction
between
trustees
and business
corporation
directors
has
diminished.., because the legal rules applicable to the conduct of
trustees and directors in this context have tended to move closer to each
other in recent years. '79 The trend, consequently, "is to hold the trustees
and directors to the business judgment rule in managing the financial
affairs of the trust but to hold them to the stricter fiduciary standard in
evaluating their fulfillment of the duty of loyalty." 80 These fiduciary
duties help to ensure that the terms set forth in governing documents are
complied with and that the mission and needs of the institution are
paramount, regardless of the organizational form of the charitable
institution.
2. Charitable Gifts and Trust Terms
Trust rules factor strongly into museum regulation because they
govern the administration of restricted charitable gifts. Gift restrictions
77White, supra note 9, at 1052. "Merryman and Elsen articulate an absolute prohibition against
self-dealing and insider advantage that is based on two interdependent rationales. One is that a
trustee must not engage in any transaction with the museum that directly or indirectly benefits the
trustee. The second is that even innocuous transactions must be prohibited in order to prevent the
harmful ones." Gerstenblith, supranote 56, at 196 n.80.
78 Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp.
1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974).
79 Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the Fiduciary
Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 409, 419 (2004). See,
for example, debate concerning the "no further inquiry" rule and John Langbein's proposal that
the rule be eliminated in favor of a best-interest rule. See John Langbein, Questioning the Trust
Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005); and for a
response, see also Melanie Leslie, In Defense of the No FurtherInquiry Rule: A Response to
ProfessorJohn Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 541 (2005).
80GERSTENBLITH, supranote 69, at 254.
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place parameters on institutional spending and limit what trustees can
do with artwork. Specifically, trust principles govern charitable gift
modification. 81 When a museum seeks to deaccession gifted artwork
with restrictions (or use a restricted gift fund for purposes other than
those set out in the gift agreement), the trustees or directors must seek
either donor consent or, in the absence of a living donor, judicial
approval in the form of cy pres. The Uniform Prudent Management of
Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) clarifies that cy pres procedures are
also applicable to restricted funds held by non-profit corporations as
well as charitable trusts. 82 Most institutions allow donors to place gift
restrictions primarily on major gifts-however that level is
institutionally defined-since restrictions on smaller gifts are generally
considered to be too administratively burdensome. For larger gifts, most
institutions have template gift agreements that set forth the rights of
both parties and allow donors to fill in the terms of the specific gift in
order to ensure clarity. Museums and other charitable organizations also
83
have internal gift acceptance policies that mirror trust rules.
Rules governing gift administration are particularly important for
museums because donated art constitutes a significant part of most

collections. William H. Luers, former president of the Metropolitan

Museum of Art, has estimated that "85 percent of most museum
collections are made up of donated works.

'84

One economist has

likewise observed:
The importance of these gifts to art museums cannot be
overemphasized: between 1965 and 1975, over 85 per cent of the
15,000 works of art added to the collection of the Metropolitan
81See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (2005). The Uniform Trust Code § 413 states in relevant part,
[I]f a particular charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to
achieve, or wasteful: (1) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part; (2) the trust
property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor's successors in interest; and (3) the
court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by directing that the trust
property be applied or distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the
settlor's charitable purposes.
Id. The comment further explains: "This section does not control dispositions made in nontrust
form. However, in formulating rules for such dispositions, the courts often refer to the principles
governing charitable trusts, which would include this Code." Id.
82 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, supra note 73,

at 4 ("UPMIFA clarifies that the doctrines of cy pres and deviation apply to funds held by
nonprofit corporations as well as to funds held by charitable trusts. Courts have applied trust law
rules to nonprofit corporations in the past, but the Drafting Committee believed that statutory
authority for applying these principles to nonprofit corporations would be helpful.").
83 See, e.g., Gift Acceptance Guidelines, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (Jan. 14, 2012),
http://www.metmuseum.org/give-and-join/gift-acceptance-guidelines; THE MUSEUM OF MODERN
ART, GIFT ACCEPTANCE POLICIES AND GUIDELINES https://www.moma.org/momaorg/shared/
pdfs/docs/about/MoMAGiftAcceptancePolicy.pdf.
84 Susan Rasky, Senate Panel Adopts Tax Change On Gifts of Art and Manuscripts, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1990, atB8.
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Museum of Art in New York came from gifts or bequests and this
situation is replicated throughout the museum world in the United
85
States.
This pattern of acquisition has not diminished in recent years. A
2014 study published by the AAMD reported: "In 2013, museums
received nearly six times as many gifts of works of art as they
purchased. These contributions mirror the private financial support that
is also essential to the health and success of art museums. ' 86 The report
does not mention what percentage of these gifts came with restrictions,
and certainly not all donated art comes with restrictions. Nonetheless,
when gifts are restricted, museums have become increasingly careful to
confirm what each party is offering and expecting in order to avoid
misunderstandings and legal conflict.
Conflicting understandings of the terms in a bequest were, in fact,
the source of one of the first public deaccessioning scandals. Adelaide
Milton de Groot, in a bequest of artwork to the Metropolitan Museum of
Art, stated that "without limiting in any way the absolute nature of this
bequest" she nonetheless did not want the museum to sell any of the
paintings. 87 De Groot preferred that the Met give any unwanted
paintings to other museums rather than sell them at auction. 88 Museum
trustees read the bequest language as precatory, and paintings were sold
in order to purchase other works.
John Canaday broke the story in The New York Times, 89 using the
word "deaccessioning" for the first time in popular media, and reported
that the
Met had recently deaccessioned-"the polite term for
'sold"' 9 0-the De Groot paintings and others at auction. Canaday
offered a strong critique of the practice, stating that deaccessioning
violated the museum's fiduciary duty to the public. Thomas Hoving, the
Met's director at the time, quickly published a response, 91 as did the
85 John W. O'Hagan, Art Museums: Collections, Deaccessioning and Donations, 22 J.
CULTURAL ECON. 197, 204 (1998). O'Hagan adds, "[T]his figure would be much higher if gifts
of cash specifically tied to the purchase of paintings were included." Id
86 ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, ART MUSEUMS BY THE NUMBERS

(2014),

https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/Art%20Museums%20By%20The%2ONumbers%20
2014 0.pdf.
87 EDWARD

PORTER

ALEXANDER

&

MARY

ALEXANDER,

MUSEUMS

IN

MOTION:

AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS OF MUSEUMS 207 (2d ed. 2008).
88 Id.See also KARL E. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST 50-54 (1977).

89 John Canaday, Very Quiet and Very Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1972, at D2 1.
90 Id.
91 Thomas Hoving, Very Inaccurate and Very Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1972. In this

Article, Hoving stated that "[p]ublic sales, exchanges and disposal by private transaction are not
new to the Metropolitan Museum." Id. Hoving estimated that 15,000 works of art had been sold
by the museum in the preceding twenty years and stated that not only were the all disposals
"carefully considered" but also that the process was "quite open." Id. Hoving also mentioned that
the money generated from art sales was never used for operations but rather to acquire "the finest
works of art possible." Id.
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president of the Met's Board of Directors, further clarifying the Met's
procedures and confirming that "an elaborate system of checks,
balances and reviews is in force." '92 Despite these efforts, "the decision
to dispose of such a large number of works by famous artists drew sharp
criticism and much negative publicity. '93 Moreover, the state attorney
general pursued an investigation into the art sales "that resulted in the
museum agreeing to notify the Attorney General of any deaccessions
worth more than $5,000."'94 This controversy highlighted the negative
consequences of deaccessioning-both in terms of legal implications
and public perception-and set the terms of the debate for future
conflict.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH DEACCESSIONING

Deaccessioning rules reveal how public resource and trust law
frameworks approach institutional rights and responsibilities differently.
Deaccessioning rules also demonstrate the different approach that each
framework takes toward public responsibilities and private agreements.
In a perfect world, the prohibition on spending deaccessioning funds on
operational needs-the crux of the controversy-would not be onerous
and the divergence between the two frameworks would not be relevant.
However, bad economies, financial uncertainties, institutional
mismanagement, and budget crises have made the prohibition deeply
relevant.
In rendering relevant the deaccessioning prohibition, financial
difficulties have also rendered more problematic the contrast between
the two frameworks and more obvious the flaws in the public resource
framework. Privileging art as a unique resource, public resource rules
require a museum to discontinue programs, make staffing cuts, or even
close its doors rather than use deaccessioning funds for operations-to
the detriment of the public. More fundamentally, the definition of the
public is vague and insufficiently differentiated. Finally, by removing
92 Douglas Dillon, The Metropolitan "Sets the Record Straight", N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1972, at
D2. Dillon explained how any recommendation for deaccessioning was subject to discussion and
approval by the curatorial staff, the Vice Director and Curator in Chief, the Director, and the
Acquisitions Committee of the Board of Trustees. The Met also adopted and published its
deaccessioning guidelines, including these five rules: (1) That there be 15 days notice for the sale
of works over $5,000; (2) Any deviation from mandatory restrictions will take place after due
process of law; (3) Any work valued over $10,000 will not be disposed of within 25 years of its
receipt; (4) Any work that is worth more than $25,000 and that has been on exhibition in the last
ten years will not be disposed of without 45 days public notice; and (5) All future sales of works
valued in excess of $5,000 will be at public auction. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW,
ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 1275-76 (2007).
93 JULIANNA SHUBINSKI, FROM EXCEPTION TO NORM: DEACCESSIONING IN LATE TWENTIETH

http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/
(2007),
18
MUSEUMS
ART
CENTURY
viewcontent.cgi?article=1 465&context=gradschool theses (M.A. thesis, University of Kentucky).
94 Sue Chen, Art Deaccessions and the Limits of FiduciaryDuty, 14 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 104
(2009).
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discretionary latitude, the public resource rules may also prevent
trustees and directors from fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities. In
this Part of the Article, I demonstrate these shortcomings through an
analysis of recent legal disputes regarding deaccessioning.
A. Bad Economies and Multiple Publics
Writing in 1971 about the "Multiple Crises in Our Museums,"
Stephen Weil stated: "In terms of operating funds, [museums] are-for
the most part-broke. That is a secret kept largely within the museum
world." 95 Weil observed that while museums appeared to be "the very
symbols of wealth" with their "magnificent holdings and palatial
buildings," the reality of the situation was that "[a]n art museum simply
cannot support itself through admissions, membership, and other
activities. ' 96 Before the 1960s, "the ideal of economic independence
secured by an adequate endowment and reliable sources of annual
support from trustees and members was a model that bore a substantial
relationship to reality. ' 97 In the late 1960s, however, a sea change in
economic conditions reshaped the museum industry and gave rise to
"the relentless and intertwined pressures to expand physically and cover
an increasing proportion of the mushrooming operating budget through
'98
earned income.
Moreover, the financial problems that began to plague museums in
the 1960s were not temporary setbacks. By the 1970s, "inflation had
begun to erode the power of endowments." 99 Skyrocketing costs for
building maintenance and art acquisition also consumed an increasingly
larger percentage of museum budgets. In the 1980s, changes in tax law
(that were subsequently repealed) had a negative impact on charitable
giving with respect to artwork because the tax benefit from the
charitable donation of an object was based on the piece's original value
when it was purchased, not on its appreciated value. 100 In addition,
donors began giving fractional gifts, which deprived museums of the
full benefit of the artwork while still giving donors tax benefits. More
recently, museums have been impacted by the 2008 economic crisis and
endowments have once again plummeted. 101 This depressed economic
95Weil, supra note 22, at 5.
96 Id.
97 Lowry, supra note

16, at 125.

98 Id.

99 Harris, supra note 26, at 39.
100 One museum director observed that, at the time, "[V]irtually every art museum in the country
has been affected negatively by the impact of the 1986 tax law on donors, who have chosen more
often than not to sell rather than giving to a museum." Rasky, supra note 84, at B8. See also Don
Fullerton, Tax Policy Toward Art Museums, in THE ECONOMICS OF ART MUSEUMS 197 (Martin
Feldstein ed., 1991) ("[T]he reduction of rates in the 1986 Tax Reform Act may depress gifts to
art museums by as much as 24 percent.").
101Christian H. Brill, Art or Assets, University Museums and the Future of Deaccessioning,28
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climate produced a corresponding impact on donor wealth and
consequently has made recent fundraising efforts more difficult.
At the same time, expenses have increased. Art prices have
climbed steeply and the cost of acquisitions has increased exponentially,
as has insurance for the artwork. Buildings constructed at the turn of the
last century are crumbling and in need of maintenance as well as repair.
These buildings "can be preserved only at increasingly heavy expense,"
without even taking into account "heavy costs in bringing ... buildings

up to national safety standards."' 02 More generally, operational costs for
stocking gift shops and staffing museums have ballooned in alignment
with expansion efforts. Consequently, "art museums... are continually
10 3
burdened by financial crises"'
This is not to say that all museums are on the verge of financial
failure. Museum attendance has been growing in recent years and in
2012, the American Alliance of Museums reported survey findings that
"the museum sector demonstrated a slow, uneven but notable
improvement in economic conditions."' 1 4 Nonetheless, the same study
found: "More than 67% of museums reported economic stress at their
institutions in 2012, ranging from moderate (44%) to severe (15%) to
very severe (9%)." 105 Moreover, an AAMD study from 2014 found that
revenue generated from each visitor only covers 15% of the total
expense for that individual.10 6 On average, the study found that an art
museum spends $53.17 per visitor and that each visitor spends
approximately $8, including admission, gift shop purchases, and
food. 107 Museums therefore depend heavily on gifts to bridge the gap in
funding and have invested heavily in development efforts and
infrastructure. And, in difficult fundraising climates, museums have
sold art to make ends meet.

THOMAS COOLEY L. REv. 61, 64 (2011) ("The decline in the stock market caused extreme drops
in museum endowments. Wealthy donors chose to give to human services rather than the arts, and
institutions were forced to reduce hours, cut staff, increase fees, or consider more drastic
measures."). For example, the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art's endowment shrank
twenty-four percent from 2008 to 2009. Meanwhile, the operating deficit increased from $1.9
million to $8.4 million from fiscal 2008 to fiscal 2009. See METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART,
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TRUSTEES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR JULY

1, 2008 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2009 50, http://www.metmuseum.org/-/media/Files/About/
Annual%20Reports/2008_2009/Entire_2009_AnnualReport.pdf.
102 Rosemary Clarke, Government Policy and Art Museums in the United Kingdom, in THE
ECONOMICS OF ART MUSEUMS 304 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1991). While the chapter discusses the
costs of building maintenance in the United Kingdom, the same can be said of American
museums.
103 White, supra note 9, at 1041.
104 American Alliance of Museums, America's Museums Reflect Slow Economic Recovery in
2012 1 (April 2013), http://www.aam-us.org/docs/research/acme-2013-final.pdfsfvrsn=2.
105 Id. at 2.
106 ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, supra note 86, at 4.

107 Id. at 2.
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1. Selling Art to Save Museums
Because of the financial crises afflicting many museums,
numerous deaccessioning cases have appeared on court dockets just as
stories have appeared in the news media about museums facing
insolvency and trying to sell art in order to meet their financial
obligations. 10 8 In 2006, for example, Thomas Jefferson University in
Philadelphia announced plans to sell Thomas Eakins' The Gross Clinic
to the Crystal Bridges Museum and the National Gallery of Art for $68
million to raise money for the school's operating budget, although no
art was ever sold because of timely community intervention. 109 In 2009,
despite donor restrictions to the contrary,1 1 0 Brandeis University
announced that it planned to close the Rose Art Museum and sell all the
paintings in order to compensate for a substantial downturn in the value
of the University's endowment, in part because of investments made
with Bernie Madoff. l t l Museum donors and board members, including a
Rose family member, objected immediately and filed a complaint
seeking a preliminary injunction to prohibit the University from selling
any paintings.
Other museums have gone through with the sale of art to raise
much-needed revenue and cover budget shortfalls. In 2008, the National
Academy Museum, on Manhattan's Upper East Side, sold two Hudson
River School paintings in order to pay for operating expenses. The
museum was immediately sanctioned by the AAMD, and thereby
banned from either borrowing artwork or engaging in collaborations
108 This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. "With government subsidies to public
institutions being cut back, museums in countries like Britain, the Netherlands and Germany need
the income from art sales to close budget gaps, make repairs or finance expansions." Doreen
Carvajal, Seeing a Cash Cow in Museums' Precious Art, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2015, at Al. In
Ireland, controversy has erupted over the proposed sale of nine works of art by Russborough
House, a Dublin-area house museum "as a way to shore up the crumbling finances of the house."
Lorne Manly, Sale of Old Masters Sets Off an Outcry in Ireland, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2015, at
Cl. The paintings in question have not been exhibited for twenty years because of security
concerns, nonetheless "the sale is also provoking an outcry among cultural-world denizens in
Ireland and some members of the foundation's board who believe the public should not lose
access to the art." Id.
109 Brill, supra note 101, at 75. Public outcry and private action kept the art in place at Thomas
Jefferson and Brandeis before court proceedings could even take place. The Gross Clinic is
shared between the Philadelphia Museum of Art and the Philadelphia Academy of the Fine Arts.
See id. at 76.
110 In the case of Brandeis University, Edward and Bertha Rose made lifetime gifts and left
bequests to the university with the understanding that the money was to establish and maintain
the Rose Art Museum. Edward's will further specified that "the Rose Art Museum will be
maintained in perpetuity as the only art museum at Brandeis." Exhibit A (Will of Edward Rose)
to Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Concerning the Rose Art Museum, Rose v. Brandeis
University (Mass. Sup. Ct. July 27, 2009), http://thebrandeishoot.com/Rose-Complaint.pdf (last
visited Sept. 27, 2015).
Il1 Id. at Exhibit E. In an email to the community, Brandeis president Jehuda Reinharz lamented:
"The decision was difficult and was reached after a painstaking assessment of the University's
need to mobilize for the future and initiate a strategy to replenish our financial assets." Id.
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with member museums. 112 The Delaware Art Museum, owing "$19.8
million in bond debt from a 2005 expansion and renovation project" and
suffering from "a significant decline [in] its endowment linked to the
financial crisis," planned to sell four paintings that would bring in an
estimated $30 million."l 3 The Museum sold the first painting on July 17,
2014, and the next day the AAMD released a statement condemning the
action and issuing sanctions. 114 Another deaccessioning involved the
Maier Museum of Art, housed within Randolph College. Randolph
College's board approved the sale of four paintings with the hopes of
raising "at least $32 million over all to shore up its endowment and
reduce a steep operating deficit." 1 15 When the College sold the one of
the paintings to the National Gallery of Britain for $25.5 million," 16 The
AAMD issued immediate sanctions, declaring,
AAMD continues to decry Randolph College's sale of works from
the Maier Museum of Art for operating funds and urges the College
to stop this practice, which not only erodes the credibility and good
standing of the Maier Museum, but also affects all art museums and
the trust that the public has placed in them. 117
In all these cases, in addition to sanctions, the museums could have
been (but were not) the subject of investigation by the attorneys general
of their respective states.
Fisk University, like these other institutions, sought to sell art in
order to raise revenue. Fisk, however, went to court because the
112Robin Pogrebin, Sanctions Are Ending For Museum, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at Cl. See
also Marlon Bishop, Art Deaccessioning: Right or Wrong?, WNYC (Oct. 10, 2010),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/98823-deaccessioning-right-or-wrong.
113Sarah Cascone, Indebted Delaware Art Museum Forced to Sell Four Paintings, ARTNET
NEWS (Mar. 26, 2014), http://news.artnet.com/in-brief/indebted-delaware-art-museum-forced-tosell-four-paintings-7514.
114Sarah Cascone, Delaware Art Museum's Deaccessioned Masterpiece Bombs at Auction,
http://news.artnet.com/market/delaware-art-museumsARTNET NEWS (June 18, 2014),
deaccessioned-masterpiece-bombs-at-auction-updated-43036. For the AAMD's response, see
Association of Art Museum Directors, Association of Art Museum DirectorsSanctions Delaware
Art Museum, ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (June 18, 2014), https://aamd.org/forthe-media/press-release/association-of-art-museum-directors-sanctions-deaware-art-museum.
115Carol Vogel, A Southern College to Sell Prized Paintings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/arts/design/02gallery.html?_r=O.
10, 2014),
116Scott Jaschik, Art vs. Endowment, INSIDE IIGIIFR ED (Feb.
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/02/10/college-sells-painting-25-million-buildendowment.
117Association of Art Museum Directors, Association of Art Museum Directors' Statement on
Randolph College and Maier Museum of Art, ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (March
2014), https://aamd.org/for-the-media/press-release/association-of-art-museum-directors12,
statement-on-randolph-college-and. See also Randy Kennedy, College Art Museum Hit With
Sanction After Sale of Bellows Work, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014 11:16 AM),
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/13/college-art-museum-hit-with-sanction-after-sale-ofbellows-work/.
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University filed a cy pres request. Fisk University, a historically black
university founded in 1866, was the recipient of 101 paintings that were
donated by Georgia O'Keeffe to the school in the late 1940s and early
1950s. Four of the paintings were the property of Georgia O'Keeffe,
and the rest O'Keeffe gave to the school from the Alfred Stieglitz
collection, in her capacity as executrix of the estate. 1 8 "All 101 pieces
were charitable, conditional gifts that were subject to several
restrictions, two of which are at issue here; the pieces could not be sold
and the various pieces of art were to be displayed at Fisk University as
one collection."' " 19
In 2005, in an attempt to keep the university financially afloat, the
University filed an ex parte Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and
sought permission to sell two valuable paintings from the Alfred
Stieglitz Collection: Radiator Building-Night, New York by Georgia
O'Keeffe and Painting No. 3 by Marsden Hartley. As stated in the
complaint, the "purpose of the proposed sale was to generate funds for
the University's 'business plan' to restore its endowment, improve its
mathematics, biology, and business administration departments, and
build a new science building."1 20 While the case was pending, the
University's request for relief "morphed" into a request for approval of
a settlement agreement with the Crystal Bridges Museum of American
Art, Inc., "whereby the University would sell a 50% undivided interest
in the entire Collection for $30 million. . .. [and] the University and
Crystal Bridges would each have the right to display the Collection at
21
their respective facilities six months of each year."'
In its amended request, the University sought relief from the
conditions placed on the gifted painting pursuant to the cy pres doctrine.
22
The University contended that its "bleak financial circumstance"'
23
rendered it "'impractical to comply with the literal terms of the gifts,"'
as did "other material changes in circumstances that have occurred in
the more than fifty years since the conditional gifts were made."' 124 The
trial court denied the University's request, concluding that, because the
terms of the gift clearly prohibited the sale of any of the paintings, cy

118 Georgia O'Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
119Id.
120GeorgiaO'Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 4 See also Brill, supra note 101, at 65 ("[U]niversity
museums serve two masters, answering to both museum and university boards. Because a
university museum cannot act completely independently, it is more susceptible to closure if its
parent university decides that another priority- such as chemistry labs-would better fulfill its
educational mission. This is made unmistakably clear by the fundamentally different missions of
independent museums and university museums.").
121GeorgiaO'Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 5.
122Id. at 15.
123Id.
124Id
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pres was not appropriate. 125 The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed
and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether or not the
University's financial straits rendered compliance with the gift terms
impractical or impossible.
On remand, the trial court concluded that financial necessity did
indeed render compliance impossible, based on the uncontradicted
testimony of Fisk's president, Hazel O'Leary. O'Leary discussed Fisk's
budget cuts and financial statements, while also demonstrating that that
the annual cost to maintain and display the Collection was $131,000.126
Subsequently, the court evaluated three proposals for revision to the
terms of the gift-two put forth by the attorney general and the one put
forth by the university. 127 The trial court rejected the two proposals put
forth by the attorney general on the grounds that they did nothing to
improve Fisk's financial situation and did not "adhere to Ms.
O'Keeffe's full dispositional design."'1 28 Furthermore, a key element in
the proposal that prevailed was "the superior resources of the Crystal
Bridges Museum to provide this important Collection excellent support
and access to the public.' 29 The Court of Appeals subsequently
affirmed the trial court's holding that it was impossible for Fisk to fulfill
the terms of the agreement because of financial distress. 130 Financial
need triggered the impossibility standard and allowed the museum to
proceed with the cy pres request.
In Fisk, as in other deaccessioning cases, a critical question
remains: "How is the public interest served when an institution is unable
to afford to pay its staff, or remain open or keep admission prices
low?"'1 31 Sanctioning museums that have sold art to pay for operational
expenses and rendering them open to lawsuits from the attorney general
is unlikely to serve the public interest. The decision to forgo
deaccessioning means finding funds elsewhere in the budget to cover
shortfalls, ultimately creating a greater likelihood that services and
programs will be cut. Programming cuts, shortened hours, and other
cutbacks significantly interfere with the public's enjoyment of and
benefit from a museum. Furthermore, the public interest is completely
extinguished if a museum is forced to close on account of financial
difficulty. As one commentator has remarked: "If the choice is between
allowing a museum to fail (or make crippling cutbacks) and selling
125Id. at 5.
126In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
127 Id. at 591.
28
1 Id. at 591-92.
129

Id. at

591.

597.
131Fincham, supra note 9, at 5. "And though museums fulfill a valuable public service by
acquiring and preserving works of art, they must keep their doors open and the lights on for those
works to be made available." Id. at 20
130 Id. at
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some art, what's the big deal? Sell art!" 132
2. Which Public Benefits?
Beyond the practical difficulties of fulfilling a duty of access to the
public in the face of looming budget cuts, another question arises about
public benefit-which public? One critic has observed: "[T]here is no
one public for art; the public for art is diverse and divided by interests
and levels of knowledge, confidence and class, not to mention race,
ethnicity, and gender. Yet this diversity stands in marked contrast to the
fictive oneness posited by mission statements issuing from museums
themselves."'' 3 3 Which slice, if any, of the public is benefitting from
museum services and collection management is a question that
destabilizes and potentially undermines any robust public resources
1 34
notion of the public trust.
In Fisk, the court addressed this question of the relevant public in a
very literal way, through the lens of geography. The appellate court in
the Fisk case remarked that numerous documents-Alfred Stieglitz's
will, Georgia O'Keeffe's 1948 Petition filed in the surrogate's court,
and O'Keeffe's letters to the then-president of Fisk-made clear that
"the charitable intent motivating the gifts of the Stieglitz Collection and
Ms. O'Keeffe's four pieces to the University was to make the
Collection available to the public in Nashville and the South for the
benefit of those who did not have access to comparable collections to
promote the general study of art." 135 At trial, the director of Fisk's Art
Gallery further explained:
[P]art of the reasoning, as it was explained to me by older hands
here, for O'Keeffe's gift to Fisk was that by giving this collection to
an historically African American institution, it would assure that
everyone would have access to it. And she was determined to
establish a kind of niche for modernism in the south. If she were to
give it to a majority institute in the south, African Americans would
have been denied access to it. Fisk already had a 36well-established
reputation as a place where races met, in Nashville.1

132Judith Dobrzynski, Op-Ed: 'The Art of the Deal',N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A2 1.
133See Andrew McClellan, A Brief History of the Art Museum Public, in ART AND ITS PUBLICS 1
(Andrew McClellan ed., 2003).
134Some critics and museum directors would say that, practically speaking, no real group is
affected by deaccessioning. "Nobody--or almost nobody-gets hurt when [a museum] sells off
works that it never exhibits or intends to exhibit. A second-rate Gerome or Rosa Bonheur, no
matter what happens to the future popularity of these now somewhat neglected 19th century
artists, can surely be dispensed with." J. Michael Montias, Are Museums Betraying the Public's
Trust?, 51 MUSEUM NEWS, May 1973, at 25, 27 (1973).
135 Georgia O'Keeffe Found.v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
136Brief of Intervenor-Appellee Attorney General and Reporter at 42, In re Fisk Univ. (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2011) (No. M2010-02615-COA-R3-CV), 2011 WL 2006328, at *45.
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The geography associated with the gift mattered.

When Fisk subsequently sought judicial approval of the Crystal
Bridges proposal, the attorney general objected on the grounds that
moving the paintings to Bentonville, Arkansas, where the Crystal
Bridges museum is located, would undermine O'Keeffe's intent to have
the art be housed in the South. At trial, the attorney general brought in
two expert witnesses trained in demography and population studies to

"testify concerning the demographic profiles and characteristics of
Bentonville, Arkansas, the home of the Crystal Bridges Museum,

compared to Nashville and the South[.]"' 137 Based on a comparison of

multiple factors-including racial composition, educational levels, and
household

incomes-one

of the expert

witnesses testified that

"Nashville more closely resembled the South" than Bentonville.138 In
terms of accessibility, the expert witness observed that "the driving
distance between Nashville and Bentonville is approximately 555 miles;
in comparison, the cities of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, are approximately the same driving distance from
Nashville, while Detroit, Michigan, and Cleveland, Ohio, are actually
139

closer to Nashville."
The university pointed out that, surprisingly, the attorney general
seemed to be arguing that "Arkansas is not in the South." 140 The answer,

the university pointed out, was: "Of course, Arkansas is in the
South.'

14 1

More broadly, however, the attorney general's argument

about geography brought up questions about what communities were
stakeholders and what defined the public in the context of the
O'Keeffe's gift. 142 In Fisk, "[b]oth the Court of Appeals and the

Chancery Court emphasized the importance of the collection for

Nashville and the South,"'143 transforming it into a "governing rubric."' 144
137Id. at *2.

138 Id. at *9-10. The attorney general's brief noted these statistics: "Racial composition Nashville population is approximately 65% white and 28% black; the South approximately 72%
white and 19% black, and Bentonville 85% white and 3% black. Household income - Nashville
has a median household income of $46,000; the South has a median household income of
$48,000; and Bentonville has a median household income of $52,584. Education - 84% of the
Nashville population has obtained a high school degree or higher; 83% of the South has obtained
a high school degree or higher; and 89% of the Bentonville population has obtained a high school
degree or higher." Id.
139 Id. at *9-10.
140The University remarked: "This argument of the Attorney General is illogical. The Attorney
General is arguing that either [1] Arkansas is not in the South or [2] the Collection must always
be in Nashville to comply with the 'in Nashville and the South' requirement. The first alternative
is obviously wrong." Id. at *16.
141Id.
142As one scholar has pointedly asked: "Who Are the Beneficiaries of Fisk University's Stieglitz
Collection?" See Alan Feld, Who Are the Beneficiaries of Fisk University's Stieglitz Collection?,
91 B.U. L. REV. 872 (2011).
143Id. at 890.
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Nonetheless, what stake Nashville had in the collection and how the
location of the collection aligned with the purposes of the gift's
geographic restrictions remained open questions.
Which public, then, had a predominating interest? Many answers
were possible: members of the Fisk community, since O'Keeffe had
selected Fisk as the home for the works; the Nashville public, even
those who never visited the museum but may have taken pride in its
presence in Nashville; 145 the South, broadly defined, giving preference
to regional concerns; or-taking seriously O'Keeffe's intentionunderserved and racially diverse communities wherever they were
located in the South. Each of these answers was correct within the terms
of the gift, and the fact that each constituency had a claim to the
paintings made clear the problem of assuming an undifferentiated and
uniform public interest.
Furthermore, as the case of the Detroit Institute of Art (DIA)
demonstrated, the public is not only differentiated through geographic
and demographic boundaries but also through social role selection and
affiliation. When Detroit declared bankruptcy in December 2013, the
largest U.S. municipality to do so to date, debate quickly turned to the
value of the city's assets, including the art in the DIA. The DIA released
a statement, even before the city was even ruled eligible for bankruptcy,
declaring: "The DIA art collection is a cultural resource of the people of
Detroit, the tri-county area and the entire State of Michigan. The
museum's collection is the result of more than a century of public and
private charitable contributions for the benefit of the public." 146 The
Institute declaimed any attempts to monetize "the museum art collection
147
to satisfy municipal obligations."'
The question quickly arose as to what course of action would most
benefit the public. The decision was "cast as a choice between
measurable benefits, like city pensions, which could be cut to satisfy
creditors, and the much harder-to-measure benefits of cultural assets." 148
Which public was to benefit-the public as city pensioners or the public

144Id.at 896.
145Id. at 890 ("The presence of the collection at Fisk enables local citizens to view it and
appreciate the educational and aesthetic experience it provides. But even if they never visit the
collection, members of the Nashville public may take pride in the presence of the Stieglitz
Collection in their city. They may expect Fisk to maintain the collection in Nashville and may
perceive the collection's removal as diminishing their city.").
146Detroit Institute of Arts Statement Regarding City of Detroit's Eligibility to File for
2013),
3,
(Dec.
ARTS
OF
INSTITUTE
DETROIT
Bankruptcy,
http://www.dia.org/user-area/uploads/DIA%20OStatement%20re%2December/203%202013%2
Odecision.pdf.
147 Id.

148Randy Kennedy & Monica Davies, Detroit's Creditors Eye Its Art Collection, N.Y. TIMES
(July 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/arts/design/detroits-creditors-eye-its-artcollection.html?_r=0.
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as art-goers? The choice was subsequently presented as one between
"fixed income" pensioners and the more elite "patrons" of the DIA. 149
Left out of the conversation was the possibility that these publics
potentially overlapped. Pensioners could also be museumgoers. They
would, however, be asked to choose which social role to inhabit and
prioritize in a situation of financial distress. The Detroit problem
likewise underscored the fact that the public interest was far from
simple or neatly divisible. Whereas Fisk emphasized the spatial
complexities of the public-and suggested the presence of multiple
communities within the public-the Detroit case revealed the possibility
that multiple publics could exist within the same community. Both Fisk
and the Detroit bankruptcy case therefore call into question the utility
and accuracy of the public resource framework by highlighting its weak
and incomplete understanding of the public.
B. The Infringement of FiduciaryDuty
Another significant problem with the public resource framework is
that it unduly limits the fiduciary power vested in trustees and directors
by trust and non-profit law to prudently govern the institution. Public
resource rules infringe on the powers granted to trustees and directors to
manage institutional affairs and interfere with the ability of institutional
leadership to use all available legal options to generate revenue for
managing operating expenses. These problems are even more acute
when the museum or gallery is an embedded institution, and the trustees
or directors have a dual fiduciary duty.
1. Managerial Authority and Prudent Investment
Trustees and directors of a museum are charged with overseeing
the institution's financial affairs, creating strategic plans, reviewing
budgetary priorities, and managing the museum's administrative
leadership. Part of a trustee or director's responsibility is also to
discharge these duties while upholding her fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty. In terms of managing institutional funds, trustees and directors
are held to the same standard pursuant to UPMIFA, which has been
enacted in 49 states as well as the District of Columbia and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. 150 UPMIFA requires "a charity and those who manage
149Id.("It's hard to go to a pensioner on a fixed income and say 'We're going to cut 20 percent
of your income or 30 percent or whatever the number is, but art is eternal,' " Mr. Nowling said.
"For people, that's a hard distinction. I think it's a distinction that some of the patrons of the
D.I.A. have a hard time understanding. We're talking about real people here with real decisions

that have real impact on their lives.").

150NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, THE UNIFORM

PRUDENT

MANAGEMENT

OF

INSTITUTIONAL

FUNDS

ACT

(UPMIFA)

(2006),

http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/prudent/20mgt%20of/o2Oinstitutional%20funds/upmif
a final_06.pdf. Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico had not enacted UPMIFA as of 2014; for
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and invest its funds"' 151 to "[g]ive primary consideration to donor intent
as expressed in a gift instrument," 152 as well as "[a]ct in good faith, with
the care an ordinarily prudent person would exercise,"153 and "[m]ake
decisions about each asset in the context of the portfolio of investments,
154
as part of an overall investment strategy."'
Despite these grants of managerial control and decision-making
latitude, especially with respect to the financial health of the institution,
a trustee's power is limited by public resource rules. Industry standards
and state statutes, the fear of de-accreditation, and the possibility of
inquiry by the attorney general may prevent trustees from exercising
their full financial authority. On several occasions, trustees-looking to
raise revenue-have even been sued for breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with deaccessioning attempts. These attempts to hold
trustees legally accountable for deaccessioning have had little success to
date; nonetheless, state statutes that mirror industry rules have the
potential to give weight to these arguments of breach of fiduciary duty.
In one such case, Dennis v. Buffalo Fine Arts Academy, the
conflict turned on the proposed deaccessioning of over 200 sculptures
and artworks by the Buffalo Fine Arts Academy. '5 The petitioners,
members of the Academy trying to obtain an injunction against the sale,
argued that "the deaccession violate[d] the stated purpose of
maintaining a collection of painting, sculpture and other works of art
and encouraging the advancement of education and cultivation of
art."'156 Furthermore, the petitioners claimed that the proposed
deaccessioning violated the museum's strategic plan-as well as donor
restrictions on several of the contemplated sale pieces-and constituted
a waste of corporate assets. The petitioner claims were brought pursuant

additional information on the Act, see id.
151 Id. at 2.
152 Id.
153Id.

154Id. In "managing and investing an institutional fund," trustees and directors are therefore held
to a prudence standard. The drafters comment that:
Since the decision in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for
Deaconesses, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (1974), the trend has been to hold directors of
nonprofit corporations to a standard nominally similar to the corporate standard but
with the recognition that the facts and circumstances considered include the fact that
the entity is a charity and not a business corporation.
The language of the prudence standard adopted in UPMIFA is derived from the
RMNCA and from the prudent investor rule of UPIA. The standard is consistent with
the business judgment standard under corporate law, as applied to charitable
institutions. That is, a manager operating a charitable organization under the business
judgment rule would look to the same factors as those identified by the prudent
investor rule.
Id. at 13.
155Dennis v. Buffalo Fine Arts Acad., 836 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
156 Id.
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to New York's Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (N-PCL). 157
Ruling in favor of the Academy, the court concluded that the
"Board believed that deaccession of these works was necessary to
promote the Academy's focus on maintaining a world-renowned
modem and contemporary art museum at the Albright-Knox Art
Gallery."' 5 8 The court added that the proposed deaccession accounted
for only a small portion of the museum's assets, and "in no way
constitutes a departure, or an ultra vires act, in violation of its corporate
purposes."' 159 In support of this ruling, the court invoked the business
judgment rule, stating:
The Board's authority to manage as it sees fit is supported by the NPCL and the business judgment rule. The business judgment
rule... states that those actions taken by a board of directors in good
faith in the exercise of honest judgment and within legitimate
160
corporate purposes cannot be overturned by a court.
Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that donor restrictions
had been disregarded, the court also concluded that the Academy had
not violated any gift restrictions. The court agreed with a determination
by the attorney general "that the will needed to contain an explicit
perpetual limit on the right to sell the item in order for the Board to have
violated the donor's intent." 16 1 The Board was therefore
"empowered... to sell property which was donated or bequeathed to
the corporation."'' 62 In a show of support for the right of the directors to
manage institutional affairs, absent a showing of bad faith, the court
dismissed the petition.
Even invoking a higher standard than the business judgment rule,
courts have similarly concluded that trustees have a right to latitude in
institutional management. In a California Superior Court case,
Rowan v. Pasadena Art Museum,163 the trustees of the museum were
charged with a breach of fiduciary duty for making allegedly improper
changes to the museum's focus and, in order to do so, improperly
deaccessioning certain items from the collection.164 The standard of care
set forth in the relevant California statute was a business standard, but
the court stated: "Members of the board of directors of the corporation
are undoubtedly fiduciaries, and as such are required to act in the
157Id.
158Id.
159Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.

163Rowan v. Pasadena Art Museum, No. C 322817 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1981).
164Id.

2015]

PUBLICITY RULES FOR PUBLIC TRUSTS

highest good faith toward the beneficiary, i.e., the public." 165 Even
applying this standard of "the highest good faith," the court concluded
that the trustees had acted in accordance with the museum's mission.
The trustees, according to the court, "had in place prudent collection
management policies and they carefully followed these policies
166
regarding the disputed deaccessioning."
Because in both cases the trustees demonstrated that good faith,
proper procedure, and due deliberation had been present, the court
determined that they correctly exercised their power to govern and
manage the museum. And, as the courts in both of these cases
concluded, nothing in non-profit law or the trust law framework
prevents trustees and directors from using their authority to engage in
strategic planning, deaccession works, or direct new expenditures. In
neither case, however, did the trustees attempt to spend the funds raised
from deaccessioning on operational needs; instead they chose to follow
industry rules and spend the proceeds on new acquisitions.
Faced with financial distress, as in the Fisk case, trustees do not
have the ability to deaccession art and use the proceeds to supplement
the operating budget. In the recent Trustees of the Corcoran Gallery of
Art v. District of Columbia case, in which the court approved a proposal
for the Corcoran's assets and operations to be taken over by the George
Washington University and the National Gallery of Art, the court
granted the cy pres request in part because of its finding that selling art
to save the Corcoran was impracticable. The court observed:
"Intervenors have argued that the Corcoran can address this shortfall of
funds both by selling some of the more than 17,000 pieces in
the Corcoran's collection . . . . [However it] is undisputed that the AAM
and the AAMD can impose, and have imposed, sanctions on museums
that have sold art to pay for operating expenses. '167
This limitation exists despite the fact that UPMIFA grants trustees
broad discretion in asset management. UPMIFA states that, in managing
institutional assets, trustees may consider "an asset's special
relationship or special value, if any, to the charitable purposes of the
institution,"1 68 "general economic conditions," 169 "other resources of the
institution," 170 and "the needs of the institution and the fund to make
distributions and to preserve capital."' 7 1 Spending deaccessioning funds

165

Id.

166 MARIE C. MALARO, COLLECTION CARE AND ACCOUNTABILITY:

LEGAL AND ETHICAL

STANDARDS (Mar. 20, 1989), C379 ALI-ABA 379, 388.
167 Trustees of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia (Sup. Ct. D.C. Aug. 18, 2014)
(No. 2014 CA 003745 B), http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/8-18-14%20Corcoran%20ruling.pdf.
168 UPMIFA, § 3(1)(h).
169 UPMIFA, § 3(1)(a).

170 UPMIFA, § 3(1)(f).
171UPMIFA, § 3(1)(g).
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on operations, although it may be a violation of public resource rules, is
within the discretion of trustees according to trust law rules. In
situations of possible insolvency, where there is a need to meet certain
basic financial obligations such as payroll or insurance premiums,
trustees who spend deaccessioning funds on operations may in fact be
fulfilling their fiduciary duty to the museum.
Borrowing from corporate law principles, a bankrupt institution
may have shifting fiduciary duties in the context of insolvency. In such
cases, fiduciary duties may run not just to the traditional stakeholdersin the case of charitable trusts, the public and the institution-but also to
institutional creditors. The Delaware Chancery Court first recognized
this "fiduciary duty quandary" 172 in a footnote to the Credit Lyonnais
case. 173 The court concluded that when a company was in the zone of
insolvency the board had a fiduciary responsibility toward the
company's creditors-"the community of interest that sustained the
corporation"-as well as to shareholders. 74 Similarly, trustees and
directors of museums facing insolvency may have a fiduciary duty
toward museum creditors that supersedes the more undefined and
problematic duty to the public. Prohibitions on spending deaccessioning
funds on operations, therefore, may limit trustee power in inappropriate
ways that prevent the fulfillment of various facets of fiduciary duty.
2. The Embedded Institution
The question of fiduciary responsibility becomes even more acute
when the museum is embedded within a larger institution and the
trustees have a double fiduciary duty-both to the museum and the
parent organization. 175 This double fiduciary duty was relevant in the
Detroit case, just as it is in the cases of university galleries and
museums. 176 In Detroit, the crux of the problem was that the museum
and its artwork had been owned by the city of Detroit since 1918, an
arrangement uncommon among city art museums. At that time, because
of financial concerns with respect to the museum, the city of Detroit
172Directorand Officer FiduciaryDuties in the Context of Insolvency, HAYNES BOONE (July 30,
2009), https://www.haynesboone.com/files/Publication/4b255e28-4eaO-4c9f-85b8-628afadO7d31/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/59469dI 0-24b3-4f44-bl e967adc70f7317/DOFiduciaryDuties_Insolvency.pdf.
173See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL
277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
174Id.at 34.
175Universities and colleges have also been criticized for selling rare books that were bequeathed
to them. Gordon College created a conflict when college leadership decided to sell rare
Shakespeare folios, donated with the provision that the collection remain intact. "Administrators
said selling a portion of the collection-which some faculty use for research-is the only way to
afford to preserve of the rest of the books." See Laura Krantz, Gordon College's Bid to Auction
Books Creates Uproar,BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2015.
176 For more discussion of the Detroit situation, see Kreder, supra note 6 (manuscript at 50-56).
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gained "authority to 'take and hold' charitable gifts for art purposes and
the obligations to 'acquire, collect, own and exhibit' Museum quality
objects and works and to build and operate a museum for the Public's
benefit."' 177 That arrangement continued for almost a century, at which
point the city declared bankruptcy and the question arose whether or not
the artwork in the DIA could be sold and the proceeds used to help
178
satisfy municipal debts.

In the bankruptcy proceedings, the judge determined that Detroit
owed $18 billion to more than 100,000 creditors. 79 Of that debt, $5.7
billion was owed as part of the Health and Life Insurance Benefit Plan
and the Supplemental Death Benefit Plan for retirees, while $3.5 billion
was in unfunded pension obligations. 180 Controversy then arose about
the valuation of city assets. The DIA, arguing that the museum and its
artwork were held in trust for the people of Detroit, firmly opposed any
attempts to monetize the collection for inclusion in any calculation of
city assets. If the court considered the artwork as restricted gifts,
according to bankruptcy law it did not form part of the bankruptcy
estate and could not be distributed to creditors. Instead, "the disposition
of the restricted gift is left to the relevant state court, applying cy pres
law." 18 1 If, however, the art was not shielded by trust restrictions, it
could be included as part of a bankruptcy estate.
After the bankruptcy proceedings were completed and the City
began restructuring its debt, museum officials remained "hopeful that
the Emergency Manager [would] recognize the City's fiduciary duty to
protect the museum art collection for future generations and that he
[would] abide by the Michigan Attorney General's opinion that the City
holds the art collection in trust and cannot use it to satisfy City
obligations." 8 2 While DIA officials declared that the City held a
fiduciary duty to the museum and its patrons, it was equally clear
however that City leaders also possessed fiduciary duties to the city of
Detroit itself and Detroit's citizens. This pressure to satisfy multiple
parties led to the "grand bargain," designed to save the museum and its
assets. According to the terms of this agreement, the City relinquished

177 Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts, supra note 3, at 5.
178 Randy Kennedy, DetroitArt Museum Offers Plan to Avoid Sale of Art, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2014, at A18 (stating the museum's "world-class collection has been targeted as a potential
source of cash to help dig Detroit out of federal bankruptcy").
179 In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 113 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
180Id.
181 Robert Cooper, Deaccessioning and Donor Intent: Lessons Learned From Fisk's Stieglitz
Collection, 2013 Columbia Law School Charities Regulation and Oversight Project Policy
Conference on "The Future of State Charities Regulation" (Feb. 7, 2013).
182 Detroit Institute of Arts Statement Regarding City of Detroit's Eligibility to File for
Bankruptcy,

DETROIT

INSTITUTE

OF

ARTS

(Dec.

3,

2013),

http://www.dia.org

/userarea/uploads/DIA%20Statement%20re%20December/203%202013%20decision.pdf.
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control of the museum' 83-and the DIA agreed to help raise $100
184
million to satisfy the City's pension and other financial obligations.
Focusing on the DIA's role of institutional citizen and public
service provider, museum officials released a statement announcing the
museum's participation:
As an anchor and investor in Detroit's Midtown neighborhood, an
educational resource for students and residents of Detroit, the tricounty area and all of Michigan and a provider of creative programs
for numerous social service and community organizations in the City
of Detroit and beyond, the Detroit Institute of Arts (DIA) is pleased
to confirm its participation in the plan.., to help bring an end to the
and
City's bankruptcy, expand support for Detroit's pensioners
85
protect the museum's collection for the public in perpetuity.1
The museum emphasized its role as a public trust institution.
Museum officials also implicitly acknowledged that the City had
fiduciary duties that ran in several directions and that the museum had a
civic responsibility to help preserve pensions along with art.
This same dual duty is also present in the cases of university
museums and galleries. Universities or other parent organizations
always have the option of presenting an art collection as a museumand seeking the relevant accreditation-or declining to hold the
collection out as such. Some institutions that collect and display art,
from airports 186 to courthouses, 187 do not characterize their collections
as museums, thereby avoiding the collections management standards
superimposed by the museum industry. Accordingly, institutions opt

183 Kennedy, supra note 178, at A 18 ("As part of the deal, the city would relinquish ownership of
the museum, and it would be owned by a nonprofit organization, as most large public museums
across the country are. This would relieve the city of any future financial responsibility for the
institute while also shielding the institute from future municipal threats.").
184 Detroit Institute of Arts to Raise $100 Million Toward Detroit's Revitalization, DETROIT
http://www.dia.org/userarea/uploads/
2014),
29,
(Jan.
ARTS
OF
INSTITUTE
Detroit%20Institute%20ofD/o20Arts%20to%2Oraise%20100%2OMillion%20toward%20Detroits%
20Revitalization.pdf ("Today, the DIA's Board of Directors approved a commitment by the DIA
to raise $100 million from corporate and individual donors toward these efforts. The DIA joins
the foundation community ($370 million) and the State of Michigan ($350 million) in support of
Chief Judge Rosen's plan to benefit the people of Detroit and the State.").
185 Id. ("None of the funds raised by the DIA will directly benefit the DIA. The funds will be
directed to a third party, which will disburse the funds for pension payments.").
AIRPORT,
INTERNATIONAL
DENVER
Collection,
Permanent
e.g.,
186 See,
http://www.flydenver.com/about/art culture/permanent (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
187 See, e.g., Art in Architecture & Fine Arts, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/103331 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) ("The Fine Arts Program
provides national leadership and expertise in fine art care and policy for GSA's Fine Arts
Collection. The program seeks to manage the Fine Arts Collection at the highest ethical and
stewardship standards and to contribute to creating high-quality federal buildings for federal
employees and the public they serve.").

2015]

PUBLICITY RULES FOR PUBLIC TRUSTS

into the industry standards and rules when they choose to characterize
their collections as museums. However, once an institution opts into the
museum form and related governance rules, it cannot easily change
structure and deaccessioning rules stick. Consequently, university and
organizational governing boards are faced with the task of governing
multiple institutional units and reconciling competing fiduciary duties.
In the Fisk case, for example, university officials sought to modify
the gift restrictions on the O'Keeffe gift as part of a strategic plan meant
to bring the university to improved financial health. University leaders
testified: "The stated purpose of the proposed sale was to generate funds
for the University's 'business plan' to restore its endowment, improve
its mathematics, biology, and business administration departments, and
build a new science building." 188 University board members were
caught between conflicting duties to keep the university as a whole
financially solvent or keep the artwork in question as a part of the
University gallery collection. Likewise, when Randolph College
deaccessioned art and used the proceeds for operational funds---despite
being subsequently sanctioned by the AAMD for doing so-the
president of the college stated: "I have to say that the primary fiduciary
responsibility of the college's Board of Trustees is to provide the
highest quality liberal education available. .. . The college has to be
financially sustainable." 89
Fiduciary duties in the context of non-profit institutions with
multiple component parts create multiple obligations. One commentator
has remarked: "When a university rather than a museum owns
artwork,... the institutional calculus becomes more complex. The
university appropriately considers the educational value of the artworks,
their relationship to the core educational mission, and the university's
capacity to derive maximum educational utility from continued
ownership of the work."' 190 Trustees, in these cases, have a fiduciary
duty to the parent institution as well as the museum and it is difficult to
say that trustees are fulfilling their fiduciary duties when they allow a
parent institution to suffer financially rather than sell art to keep the
institution solvent.
III. PRIVILEGING PUBLIC PROCESS OVER PRINCIPLE
The public resource framework and rules misunderstand the
multiple forms of both the public and public benefit while also
undervaluing the importance of fiduciary duty. Public resource rules
privilege the principle of art as a public resource to the detriment of
188Georgia O'Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
189Id.
190Feld, supra note 142, at 879. See also Emily Lanza, Breaking up is Hard to Do: The Sale of
CharitableArt Donations, 66 THE TAX LAWYER 483 (2013).
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institutional flexibility and asset management. 19 1 The trust law
framework is, consequently, preferable. Trust law rules privilege
process and work to ensure not only that trust and gift terms are
complied with but also that trustees and directors fulfill their fiduciary
duties. Process is critical, because "[r]easons for deaccessioning can be
sound, stupid or nebulous, and a critical review of an institution's
activities in this area will reveal how seriously it pursues its stewardship
duties."' 192 Retaining the trust law framework as it currently exists may
not, however, be sufficient.
A very real and legitimate concern is that without threat of the
industry rules and sanctions, trustees have no constraints that prohibit
them ex ante from treating art as a fungible commodity. In an
environment defined by weak legal regulation and few accountability
measures, deaccessioning prohibitions and industry rules may play an
important role in shaping trustee behavior.193 Deaccessioning
prohibitions may moderate risk-taking on the part of the trustees and
help reinforce the unique mission of stewarding art. There may,
however, be other ways to provide accountability measures and restrain
trustees from insulated and unchecked decisionmaking. If, as Deborah
DeMott suggests trustees and nonprofit directors "make decisions in a
less transparent environment and information about their decisions is
not regularly exposed to the scrutiny of a broad audience,"' 194 then an
increase in publicity could serve a beneficial function by enabling
greater transparency and inclusivity in nonprofit governance.
Because the museum is a public trust, its regulation should be
explicitly grounded in the notions of publicity and transparency. In this
Part of the Article, I propose an approach to enhancing current trust law
rules by borrowing from corporate law and crafting new rules around
the normative values we wish to see reflected in public trust institutions.
I propose that rules for public trusts should focus primarily on the
principle of publicity and, more specifically, on procedural transparency
and information disclosure. Procedural transparency is important
because "an examination of how museums actually accomplish their
deaccessioning [is telling],"' 195 and because it gives the public a role in
191 See Kreder, supra note 6 (manuscript at 57) ("In sum, despite use of the term 'public trust' in

recent litigation, in the museum context it amounts to an ethical ideal, not a legal standard.").
192 Steven Miller, Deaccessioning: Sales or transfers?, 10 MUSEUM MGMT. & CURATORSHIP

245,248 (1991).

193See Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactionsin Nonprofit Corporations,59 BROOK. L.
REv. 131, 139 (1993); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes,Problems, and ProposedReforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 641 (1998) ("[A]most
all evidence suggests that nonprofit directors provide less oversight, less effective participation in

decisionmaking, and in general, less effective governance than their peers in comparable forprofit corporations.").
194DeMott, supra note 193, at 139.
195Miller, supra note 192, at 248.
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institutional oversight. In addition, these publicity rules serve as
constraints on trustees, obliging them to be able accountable to various
public groups and institutional constituents.
As John Stuart Mill remarked: "To be under the eyes of others-to
have to defend oneself to others-is never more important than to those
who act in opposition to the opinion of others, for it obliges them to
have sure ground of their own."' 196 Procedural transparency and public
visibility serve a checking function, which is why AAMD guidelines
state that it is "important that a museum's deaccessioning process be
publicly transparent" in order to safeguard against breaches of fiduciary
duty and public trust. Disclosure of information is equally important
because it also gives the public the opportunity to enter into dialogue
with an institution and can "help to demystify deaccessions." 197 In the
sections that follow, I propose increasing the publicity value of the
deaccessioning process through the strategic use of cy pres and
deviation, required reporting and disclosure, and public auctions. Using
these legal tools, museums will be better able to fulfill their distinctive
obligations as public trusts.
A. Cy Pres, Deviation, andJudicialImprimatur
Cy pres petitions and requests for administrative deviations are
important trust doctrines that can increase the public dimension of
deaccessioning practices. Speculating about deaccessioning processes,
one critic has remarked:
What if a museum had to argue its case for de-accessioning art
before an impartial arbitrator?... [T]he museum would need to open
its financial books completely, so that the arbitrator could see that all
other reasonable avenues of fund-raising, as well as cutbacks, had
already been exhausted. And it would need to open its cataloguing
records and storerooms, to show that the departure of the works in
question would not irreparably damage the collection and that no
198
donor agreements would be violated.
Cy pres and deviation requests accomplish precisely these goals.
The cy pres doctrine, a doctrine of obscure historical roots,

99

was

196John Stuart Mill, Considerationson Representative Government, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER
ESSAYs 203, 360-61 (1861, 1998).
197Goldstein, supra note 13, at 224.
198Dobrzynski, supra note 132.
199"The doctrine of cy pres ... was known and used in Rome before Constantine.... A Case
applying the cy pres principle appears in the Digest ofJustinian." EDITH L. FIscH, THE CY PRES
DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Matthew Bender & Co., 1950). "So far as can be
ascertained, [the term] cy-pr6s first appears in Littleton's Tenures (c. 1481)." L.A. SHERIDAN &
V.T.H. DELANEY, THE CY-PRts DOCTRINE 5 (1959).
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designed to allow courts to modify the terms of an outdated or
excessively narrow trust agreement and to remedy value-impairing
conditions. "The words 'cy pres' are Norman French for 'as near.' The
phrase when expanded to its full implication was 'cy pres comme
possible,' and meant 'as near as possible.' 20 0 Accordingly, the doctrine
allows courts to modify trust and gift terms in order to approximate
donor intent or institutional mission as nearly as possible. The doctrine
has been adopted in the Restatement of Trusts and the Uniform Trust
Code, both of which allow a court to modify the terms of a gift if the
charitable purpose "becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to
achieve, or wasteful. '201 Similarly, UPMIFA has adopted the cy pres
doctrine, and provides for its use in the context of both charitable trusts
202
and non-profit corporations.
The process begins when the trustees or directors determine that

the terms of the trust, gift, or fund have become impossible or
impracticable to fulfill, and they file a cy pres petition seeking to

modify the conditions. Once the petition is filed, courts apply a three200 "The fairly common usage, 'si pray,' seems to be a mixture of French and English
pronunciation. Roughly speaking, it is the doctrine that equity will, when a charity is originally or
later becomes impossible or impracticable of fulfillment, substitute another charitable object
which is believed to approach the original purpose as closely as possible." BOGERT'S TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES ch. 22, § 431 (2013).
201The Uniform Trust Code § 413 states in relevant part:
[I]f a particular charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to
achieve, or wasteful: (1) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part; (2) the trust
property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor's successors in interest; and (3) the
court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by directing that the trust
property be applied or distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the
settlor's charitable purposes.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (West 2005). The comment to this section further states that,
The doctrine of cy pres is applied not only to trusts, but also to other types of charitable
dispositions, including those to charitable corporations. This section does not control
dispositions made in nontrust form. However, in formulating rules for such
dispositions, the courts often refer to the principles governing charitable trusts, which
would include this Code.

Id.

202 THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 433. UPMIFA drafters remark:
UPMIFA clarifies that the doctrines of cy pres and deviation apply to funds held by
nonprofit corporations as well as to funds held by charitable trusts. Courts have applied
trust law rules to nonprofit corporations in the past, but the Drafting Committee
believed that statutory authority for applying these principles to nonprofit corporations
would be helpful. UMIFA permitted release of restrictions but left the application of cy
pres uncertain. Under UPMIFA, as under trust law, the court will determine whether
and how to apply cy pres or deviation and the attorney general will receive notice and
have the opportunity to participate in the proceeding. The one addition to existing law
is that UPMIFA gives a charity the authority to modify a restriction on a fund that is
both old and small.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, THE UNIFORM

PRUDENT MANAGEMENT
OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (UPMIFA)
4 (2006),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/prudent/20mgt%20o/20institutional%20funds/upmif
a_final_06.pdf.
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part test in order to evaluate whether cy pres is appropriate. In the
absence of contravening language in the governing document, cy pres
"requires the presence of three criteria: (1) a charitable trust; (2) a
specific trust purpose that is illegal, impractical, or impossible; and (3) a
general charitable intention by the donor. '20 3 If these conditions are met,
the court will modify the terms of the trust such that they are as near as
20 4
possible to those of the original gift.
Courts have progressively relaxed all three of these requirements,
and some scholars suggest that "policy considerations and concern for
furthering the public welfare [have become] of increasing importance in
delimiting and defining the degree and type of impracticality necessary
to call the cy pres doctrine into operation. '20 5 Furthermore, in the wake
of recent reforms to the Uniform Trust Code, the cy pres doctrinal
framework has been updated to provide for more efficient cy pres
regulation. 20 6 In 2003, the Uniform Trust Code, following modifications
to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts in 2001, modified the cy pres
doctrine to include a presumption of general charitable intent. 207 States
that have adopted the Uniform Trust Code also allow courts to modify
trust restrictions if those restrictions produce "wasteful" results. 20 8 This
shift is also present in the Restatement, which includes the previously
absent term "wasteful" and states that cy pres may be appropriate when
it "becomes wasteful to apply all of the property to the designated
purpose. '20 9 Finally, the doctrine of deviation, applicable to both
charitable and private trusts, was another major change brought about
by the Restatement (Second) § 167, and subsequently incorporated in
203 Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 555 (Iowa 2007).
204 "Finally, in applying cy pres, courts must generally seek a purpose that conforms to the

donor's objective 'as nearly as possible."' In re Elizabeth J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift, 125 Haw.
351, 360 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Am. Jur.2d § 157). A comment to § 67 of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts states that the modified purpose "need not be the nearestpossible but one
reasonably similar or close to the settlor's designated purpose[.]" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d (2003).
205 FISCH, supra note 199, at 143.
206 See Allison Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable Giving, 95 B.U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming
2015).
207 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a) (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
208 As of 2014, the Uniform Trust Code had been adopted by thirty states and had been
introduced in New Jersey. Legislative Fact Sheet-Trust Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
(last visited Sept.
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code
27, 2015) (listing the states that have adopted the Uniform Trust Code: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
209RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). In a comment to this section, the Reporter
described "wasteful" as meaning that the funds far exceed what is necessary, rendering it
imprudent not to expand the purposes for which the funds can be applied. See id. § 67 cmt. c (1)
("The term 'wasteful' is used here neither in the sense of common-law waste nor to suggest that a
lesser standard of merely 'better use' will suffice.").
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the Uniform Trust Code as well. The current version of the Code states:
"[t]he court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a
trust or terminate the trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated
by the settlor, modification or termination will further the purposes of
'210
the trust.
Institutions can, therefore, use cy pres requests to change gift
conditions, such as the restriction on selling a piece of art or alternately
on a charitable trust that provides specifically designated institutional
funding. As the Fisk case demonstrates, cy pres petitions can not only
successfully allow a museum to deaccession art in contravention of
bequest terms but also to obtain approval for other arrangements, such
as art sharing. Looking forward, cy pres could also be expanded for use
as a mechanism for approving the use of deaccessioning funds for
purposes other than acquisitions. In such situations, cy pres petitions
would require judicial inquiry into the institution's financial health, as
well as judicial approval of any proposed spending of the funds that
deviated from traditionally authorized uses. This type of safeguard
would provide museums with the ability to use funds for daily
operations but would also put into place a mechanism for ensuring that
deaccessioning was not used repeatedly as a method for financing
operations but rather as an emergency measure. This type of judicial
inquiry would therefore ensure that trustees were taking such steps in
order to fulfill-rather than sidestep-fiduciary duty to the institution.
The deviation doctrine is a similarly useful tool for institutions
seeking to modify terms. Deviation is distinct from cy pres in that
deviation applies to administrative terms and cy pres relates to
substantive terms. The main operational difference between the two
doctrines is that deviation is considered to be a more flexible tool in
reforming charitable trust terms. 211 Accordingly, "[c]ourts appear to
apply the deviation doctrine in situations short of impossibility,
particularly when 'effective philanthropy' or the public interest is
paramount. '212 One of the most well known judicial applications of the
doctrine of deviation occurred with the Barnes Trust and the relocation
of the museum to Philadelphia from Lower Merion. In that case, the
doctrine of deviation allowed the court to modify trust terms in order to
permit changes to the size of the Foundation Board, changes in
operating hours, the use of the facility for fundraising purposes, and an
210 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (emphasis added) (adding that "[t]o the extent practicable, the
modification must be made in accordance with the settlor's probable intention"). In the comment
to this section, the drafters added: "[t]he purpose of the 'equitable deviation' authorized by
subsection (a) is not to disregard the settlor's intent but to modify inopportune details to
effectuate better the settlor's broader purposes." Id.
211Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use
of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REv. 354, 354 (1999).
212 Id.
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increase in admission fees. The most highly contested change, brought
about through deviation as well, was the modification of trust terms
213
stipulating that the artwork not be moved from its original location.
These changes demonstrate the extent to which courts can use deviation
to modify terms governing the operation of an institution.
Judicial willingness to give effect to general charitable purpose has
made cy pres and deviation twin tools for the modification of trust
terms. In the case of public trusts, cy pres and deviation are particularly
important tools because they require judicial intervention and public
process. These judicial procedures increase the transparency of the
deaccessioning process by providing a public forum for information
discovery and questioning of the parties. These procedures, moreover,
involve soliciting the participation of the attorney general, acting on
behalf of the public interest, and allow both parties-the institution and
the attorney general-to propose solutions that best match both
institutional need and public interest. Furthermore, cy pres and
deviation requests lend legitimacy by involving courts and thereby
providing impartial arbiters to evaluate the evidence as well as the
proposed solutions. Taking these questions to court has drawbacks, no
doubt, including cost and time. 214 Nevertheless, the benefits of a public
forum, forced information sharing, dual party proposals, and impartial
judicial analysis outweigh the drawbacks. Consequently, museums can
use cy pres petitions and deviation requests to realize these benefits,
receive the imprimatur of judicial process, and create positive
externalities with respect to the public.
B. Disclosure,Reporting, and PublicAuctions

While trust law provides a solution to increase procedural
transparency in the form of cy pres and deviation requests, corporate
law also provides solutions in the form of disclosure, reporting, and
notice requirements. Disclosure, a widely recognized means of enabling
corporate transparency, has been perceived as an effective mechanism
for increasing not only informational equity but also "the accuracy of

213 In 2003, in response to financial circumstances, the trustees filed a petition to restructure the
Foundation Board and relocate the collection from Lower Merion to Philadelphia in conjunction
with the acceptance of a proposal from the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Lenfest Foundation.
Pew and Lenfest offered $150 million to "ensure the Foundation's long-term financial health,"
conditioned on the collection's move into Philadelphia. See Second Amended Petition of the
Barnes Foundation to Amend Its Charter and Bylaws at 5, In re The Barnes Foundation (Ct. C.P.
http://www.barnesfriends.org/downlload/
58,788),
(No.
2003)
21,
Oct.
Pa.
2ndamended_petition-barnes.pdf.
214 For a sample of the critiques leveled against cy pres judicial analysis, see Rob Atkinson,
Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1114 (1993); C. Ronald Chester, Cy Pres: A
Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. L. J. 407, 414 (1979); John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the
Management ofRestricted CharitableGifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 123, 125-26 (2010).
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decisionmaking. 215 For these reasons, certain affirmative disclosure
rules in the corporate setting have been made mandatory in the hope of
creating public and investor trust in markets, preventing fraud, and
eroding informational advantages held by the corporation. 216 These
same benefits obtain in the non-profit setting. Furthermore, corporate
law offers a model for selling art at auction that brings to bear both
public benefit and institutional need.
1. Disclosure and Reporting Requirements
Currently, museums and other non-profit organizations are
required to file an annual 990 report in order to maintain tax-exempt
status, along with an annual financial report and a copy of an annual
audit. 217 Many museums make these documents publicly available on
their institutional websites. 218 To the extent that museums are already
making these reports readily available to the public as a standard
practice, disclosure is already present. However, all institutions should
be obliged to make these reports publicly available in some manner. In
these reports, museums do and should list any works that were
deaccessioned during the reporting year. In the Metropolitan Museum
of Art's 2013 Annual Report, there is a listing of the members of the
Acquisitions Committee as well as a list of "Objects Sold or
Exchanged" during that fiscal year for over $50,000 and the total
revenue generated from art sales (approximately $5.5 million). 219 The
Met's deaccessioning policies are also accessible on the website. 220 This
215 A.D.E. Lewis, Bentham's View of the Right to Silence, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL
ASSESSMENTS 360 (Bhikhu C. Parekh ed., 1993) ("Bentham's principal aim was to achieve the
fullest possible disclosure of relevant information consistent with the minimum of unnecessary
inconvenience.").
216 For a discussion of corporate reporting requirements, see JESSE CHOPPER, JOHN COFFEE &
RONALD GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 291-300 (2013).

217 For an overview of the New York State requirements, see New York Registration and
Reporting Requirements for Nonprofit Organizations, NONPROFIT COORDINATING COMMITTEE
OF NEW YORK, INC., http://www.npccny.org/info/gti5.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
Corporations are subject to similar requirements and must file annual reports along with other
forms pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012).
218 See, e.g., Annual Reportsfor the MetropolitanMuseum ofArt, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM
OF ART http://www.metmuseum.org/en/about-the-museum/annual-reports/reports
(last visited
Sept. 27, 2015); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS JUNE 30, 2013 AND 2012 (Oct. 2, 2013),
https://www.moma.org/pdfs/docs/about/MoMAFY 13.pdf, MUSEUM OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

BIENNIAL REPORT FY 2011 & FY2012,
http://www.mcny.org/sites/default/files/
Biennial%20Report%202011-12.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).

219 METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
TRUSTEES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR JULY 1, 2012 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2013 48,

http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/annualreports/-/media/Files/About/Annual%20Reports/2012_2013/Annual%20Report%202013.pdf.
220 See Collections Management Policy, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART,
http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/collections-management-policy#deaccessioning
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015) ("The Board of Trustees approved detailed Procedures for
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level of disclosure and availability should be standard for museums,
such that anyone can easily access the reports and learn what pieces
221
have been deaccessioned and at what price.
There is more, however, that museums can do to disclose and
publicize information about proposed deaccessioning. Disclosure rules
could mandate that any proposed sales be disclosed on institutional
websites or in other public communications, and that these disclosures
satisfy specified periods of public notice. 222 The policies instituted by
the Met after the attorney general's investigation incorporated these
concepts of public notice and a waiting period. In particular, the Met's
policies provided that the museum would give fifteen days' notice for
the sale of any work valued at over $5,000 and forty-five days' notice
for any work that had been on exhibition in the previous ten years and
was valued at or above $25,000. Museum directors have objected to the
imposition of such requirements on the grounds that advance notice
"would seriously inhibit the flexibility and confidentiality necessary to
achieve the best prices in sales. ' 223 It is possible, however, that public
notice could increase the price of a work by increasing the number of
potential buyers and increasing the efficiency of the art market. In either
case, the gains in publicity and benefit to public trust incurred by this
type of notice outweigh speculative, potential harm to the final sale
224
price.
More importantly, along with the public notice of sale, the
publicity approach would require museums to state the institutional
reasons for the deaccessioning, how the sale would fit into a larger
collections management strategy, and where the revenue would go. If
the proceeds were intended to supplement the general operating budget,
a museum would be required to make public the case for such spending.
Like a cy pres request detailing the estimated revenue as well as the
intended use of that incoming revenue, the museum would be required
to state all these facts as well as the institutional strategy behind the
proposed sale in a document to which the public had access. Taking this
approach, the transgression would not be the use of deaccessioning
funds to support operations. Rather, the violation would consist of the
Deaccessioning and Disposing of Works of Art at a Special Meeting held on June 20, 1973. The
Procedures were updated in February 2005 and are available upon request from the Counsel's
Office.").
221Stephens recommends this type of public disclosure in her proposed deaccessioning policies.
See Stephens, supra note 55, at 180.
222 The corporate analogue might be the requirements mandated by the Williams Act for
disclosure at various points during takeover bids.
223William Rubin, Museum of Modern Art, Public Hearings, Attorney General's Conference of
Museum Representatives, Oct. 19, 1973, at 68.
224 See David R. Gabor, DeaccessioningFine Art: A Proposalfor Heightened Scrutiny, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 1005, 1042 (1988-1989) (recommending this type of forty-five day waiting period for

museums proposing to deaccession artwork).
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failure to disclose sufficient public information.
Finally, in specific circumstances, disclosure concerning
deaccessioning plans might also take a more interactive and consultative
approach. At the 1973 hearings convened by the attorney general in the
wake of the Met's deaccessioning scandal, the director of the Everson
Museum of Art, a small upstate museum, spoke of the relationship
between his institution and the local community. He noted that the
museum shared resources with local community groups, such as the
historical society, and remarked that in a sale situation "[m]ost of the
objects we would have for sale would essentially be of local
interest... local artists and in other cases, material that has local
historical value. ' 225 Sale objects might have particular resonance for a
local community or constituency as part of a unique cultural heritage. 226
In these cases, required consultation with the local constituencies is an
appropriate rule. Scholars have suggested that museums have, at the
very least, "an ethical duty... to consult with the representatives
designated by the people whose cultures and environments are
represented .... Such an ethical duty might require consultation with
designated representatives as to accession, . . . and deaccession of

collections. '227 Deaccession plans, from this perspective, would entail
not just passive disclosure but an active engagement with community
members in order to approve of art sales and create safe harbors for any
228
such transactions.
2. Public Auctions and Desperation Deaccessioning
In addition to concerns over disclosure and the circulation of
adequate information to the public, another concern with respect to
deaccessioning is who buys the art. Deaccessioning art sales are
considered to be a particular violation of the public trust when the
artwork is sold at private auction or returns to private hands through
public auction. 229 A number of commentators have proposed a rule

225 James Harithas, Everson Museum of Art, Public Hearings, at 50.
226 In Germany, "legislation [has been] proposed by the German government to monitor and limit
art exported for sale." Doreen Carvajal, As Germany Tries to Hold On to Its Art, Some Works
Drop From View, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 18, 2015, at A9. Regional authorities would have the power to
grant or deny export licenses for works of art over 50 years old and worth more than 150,000
euros. "The controls are meant to slow or block the movement of art to other countries for
auctions, private sales, exhibitions or art fairs." Id.
227 Willard L. Boyd, Museums as Centers of Controversy, 128 DAEDALUS AM. MUSEUMS 185,
197 (1999). See also Brill, supra note 101, at 89 ("As part of this process, a more vigorous
public-input portion would help ensure that the voices of those who benefit the most from the art
would be heard.").
228 Corporate law analogues are relevant as corporations can "cleanse" transactions that may
involve self-dealing or other breaches of fiduciary duty through shareholder ratification.
229 See Carvajal, supra note 108, at Al ("[A]rt sales ... [have] led to fears that masterpieces will
disappear from public view to adorn the living room walls of a Saudi prince or hedge-fund
billionaire.").
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stating that deaccessioned artwork always be sold at public auction. The
Met, since the creation of its internal policies on regulation, has stated
that all artworks valued at over $5,000 will be sold at public auction.
This requirement, like the disclosure requirements, ensures at the very
least that art sales are not secret events, held in private and closed to the
public. Critics of this policy, like the critics of disclosure, invoke the
230
need for confidentiality and flexibility in obtaining the highest price.
However, while flexibility is important, it is even more important to
signal public participation and public trust values by keeping art sales
open to the general public.
Other commentators have gone further and suggested that
museums should always be given first opportunity to purchase the art,
or that the museum selling the art attempt to broker trades or sharing
agreements with colleague institutions before considering other options.
Michael Kimmelman has proposed the following rule: "[W]henever art
is sold by a public institution... local museums should be given a
reasonable period of time to match the sale price ....a shot at

preserving the public's heritage for the public. '231 Likewise, Adrian
Ellis has suggested that we "embrace more readily active trades within
the museum community" and that it is important "for the museum
community to see itself more as just that-a community-and allow for
a more comfortable distribution of resources between cash poor asset
rich institutions and asset poor cash rich ones, allowing them to trade to
mutual advantage. ' 232 A museum could therefore accept sale offers
from other museums or craft alternative arrangements while carrying
out its mission of maximizing benefit to the public.
The problem with the public auction and the right of first refusal
going to museums is that "[p]ublic nonprofit organizations often lack
the financial resources to compete with private buyers. As a result,
trustees may be forced to forego the maximum sale price in order to
keep the work accessible to the public. ' 233 Here again, corporate
principles may provide a solution. In the context of corporate takeovers
230 William Rubin, Museum of Modem Art, Public Hearings, supra note 223, at 71.
231Michael Kimmelman, A City's Heart Misses A Beat, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2005),

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/16/arts/design/a-citys-heart-misses-a-beat.html.

See

also

Dobrzynski, supra note 132, at A21 ("Most important, as part of any deal permitting the sale of
art, the de-accessioning museum would have to offer the works to other museums first. If it

received no offers, it could sell the pieces via a public auction-and any American museum

would then have the opportunity to match a winning bid if it promised to keep the work in a
public collection.").
232Adrian Ellis, A New Approach to the Deaccessioning Issue, THE ART NEWSPAPER (Mar.
Donn
http://aeaconsulting.com/idea/a-new_approach-to-the-deaccessioning rule.
2004),
Zaretsky supports and discusses the "Kimmelman and Ellis rules for deaccessioning." See Donn
Zaretsky, Where were we (again)? (UPDATED), THE ART LAW BLOG (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://theartlawblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/where-were-we-again.html.
233White, supra note 9, at 1063.
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and reorganization, when a company is clearly and inescapably the
target of a takeover, the board has a duty to command the highest
possible price for the company-a board's Revlon duty. 234 Nonprofit
institutions could similarly be allowed to pursue the highest bid in cases
of extreme need. That is to say, in cases of severe financial distress,
when either insolvency or reorganization appears unavoidable,
museums could be allowed to sell to the highest bidder, even if that
bidder is a private one. 235 The New York Board of Regents considered a
rule similar to this one in 2008. That rule, called the "desperation
deaccession" rule would have permitted museums
with the approval of the Board of Regents, to sell or transfer items or
material in its collections to another museum or historical society for
purposes of obtaining funds to pay outstanding debt, and thereby
provide an alternative to the institution's bankruptcy or dissolution,
and the possible loss or liquidation of a collection because of debt.236
The proposal, however, was heavily criticized as being too far out
of alignment with industry rules and quickly abandoned. 237
Respecting the role of mission as well as the needs of stakeholders,
deaccessioning sales should take place at public auctions and trustees
should give purchasing priority to other public institutions, actively
seeking out partner organizations and resource exchanges. Nevertheless,
in cases of institutional insolvency, trustees should have increased
latitude to sell art to the highest bidder, if only in order to fulfill their
fiduciary duties to the institution, creditors, and other economic
stakeholders. In all these cases, rules about notice and public auction
would apply; museums could however consider bids from private
buyers. Sarah Tam has remarked, "Museums have the power to
demonstrate to the public that deaccession is not a breach of the trust
that the public has given to museums. ' 238 It is only with policies and
legal practices that incorporate publicity values and mechanisms that
museums will make visible their commitment to the public and to their
missions of providing public benefit.
234 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). Gabor
endorses this approach. See Gabor, supra note 224, at 1038 ("[A] museum should be free simply
to accept the highest bid. The public will be served, because all revenue must be directed back
toward the purchase of other art works."); White, supra note 9, at 1064 ("Accordingly, courts
should require museums to sell to public buyers, unless the potential income of a private sale is

significantly higher.").

235 As discussed in Part II.B.,
this may in fact be part of a trustees' fiduciary duty.
236 See Jared Lenow & John Sare, New York Board of Regents Adopts New Deaccessioning
Rules, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=569f91fl5f52-4f6e-9025-539f1 809f2d8.
237 Id.
238 Tam, supra note 18, at 900.
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CONCLUSION

The public trust is an evocative and robust cultural notion that is
supported by two overlapping and sometimes conflicting legal
frameworks: the public resource and trust law frameworks. The public
resource framework places high priority on the principle of art as a
public resource, substantiating this cultural claim with principles
adopted from natural resource and tax law. The trust law framework
focuses, instead, on compliance with governing documents, donor
stipulations, and the fiduciary duty of trustees and directors. For the
most part, these two frameworks offer slightly different but
complementary analytics. In the case of deaccessioning rules, however,
the two conflict. Public resource rules-instantiated in industry and
local governance rules-prohibit the spending of deaccessioning funds
on operational needs. Trust rules require only that any sale and spending
be in alignment with the institutional charter and any applicable trust or
gift conditions.
Consequently, the debate over deaccessioning not only provides us
with a better view of how each framework operates but also reveals the
weaknesses in the public resource framework. Because the public
resource framework assumes a weak and incomplete understanding of
"the public" and limits the ability of trustees to fully satisfy their
fiduciary duties, the trust law framework is preferable. Because of the
special nature of the public trust, however, the trust law framework
should be enhanced so that all regulation is grounded in publicity
values. Trust law doctrines, including cy pres and deviation, can be used
to increase publicity through judicial intervention. In addition, corporate
law principles such as information disclosure, public notice, and public
processes can also increase publicity. Approaching regulation from this
perspective will help resolve conflicting accounts of what legal
framework is best suited to museum regulation and help museums not
only maximize institutional flexibility but also dispatch their unique
obligations as public trusts.

